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When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, (rea-
son’s) conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the ap-
pearance of the morning; and ‘tis difﬁcult for us to retain even that convic-
tion, which we had attained with difﬁculty… (Hume, 1739/, p 507).
…we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in
order to live simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to dif-
ferent rules. If we were to apply the unmodiﬁed, uncurbed rules (of caring
intervention to do visible ‘good’) of the…small band or troop, or…our fami-
lies…to the (extended order of cooperation through markets), as our in-
stincts and sentimental yearnings often make us wish to do, we would destroy
it. Yet if we were to always apply the (noncooperative) rules of the extended
order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them. (Hayek, 1988, p
18). (Italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).
We have become accustomed to the idea that a natural system like the hu-
man body or an ecosystem regulates itself. To explain the regulation, we look
for feedback loops rather than a central planning and directing body. But
somehow our intuitions about self-regulation do not carry over `to the artiﬁ-
1 The title was suggested to me in the paper by Joel Norman, “Two Visual Systems and Two
Theories of Perception: An Attempt to Reconcile the Constructivist and Ecological Approaches,
”Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2002. After ﬁnishing this paper I found that my use of the term
below had been used by Gigerenzer, et al. (1999), for application to “fast and frugal decision mak-
ing,” by individuals: “A heuristic is ecologically rational to the degree that it is adapted to the struc-
ture of an environment.” (p. 13). Hayek, in the citations below identiﬁes both kinds of rationality.
2 Doing experimental economics has changed the way I think about economics. There are many
reasons for this, but one of the most prominent is that designing and conducting experiments
forces you to think through the process rules and procedures of an institution. Few, like Einstein,
can perform detailed and imaginative mental experiments. Most of us need the challenge of re-
al experiments to discipline our thinking. In this paper I hope to indicate how my thinking has
been changed in some detail. I am indebted to Syd Siegel for technical and conceptual inspira-
tion; to John Hughes, Stan Reiter, and the Purdue faculty from 1955 to 1967 for warm tolerant
support beginning with my ﬁrst experiment; to Charles Plott, Charles Holt and Martin Shubik
for many valuable encounters over the years on institutional and experimental issues; to students,
visitors, the current ICES team, and especially to my growing but tolerating family who have
made all these years the best years of my life.503
cial systems of human society. (Thus)…the…disbelief always expressed by
(my) architecture students (about)…medieval cities as marvelously patterned
systems that had mostly just “grown” in response to myriads of individual de-
cisions. To my students a pattern implied a planner… The idea that a city
could acquire its pattern as “naturally” as a snowﬂake was foreign to them.
(H. Simon, 1981/1996, p 33).
Historically, a recurrent theme in economics is that the values to which
people respond are not conﬁned to those one would expect based on the
narrowly deﬁned canons of rationality. These roots go back to Adam Smith
(1759, 1776) who examined the moral sympathies that characterize natural
human sociality.3 Contrary to vulgar impressions, in Smith’s view, each indi-
vidual deﬁned and pursued his own interest in his own way, and individuals
were mischaracterized by the metaphor, ‘economic man.’ (Cf Hayek, 1991, p
120). This careless scholarship fails to recognize the key proposition articu-
lated by the Scottish philosophers: to do good for others, does not require de-
liberate action to further the perceived interest of others. As Mandeville so
succinctly put it, “The worst of all the multitude did something for the com-
mon good.” (See Mandeville’s poem, ‘The Grumbling Hive’ or ‘Knaves
Turned Honest,’ 1705; quoted in Hayek, 1991, p 82). Many contemporary
scholars, and not only popular writers, have reversed Mandeville’s proposi-
tion, and argued that the standard socio-economic science model (SSSM) re-
quires, justiﬁes and promotes selﬁsh behavior.4 On the contrary, because en-
forceable rights can never cover every margin of decision, opportunism in all
relational contracting and exchange across time are costs, not beneﬁts, in
achieving long-term value from trade; an ideology of honesty 5 means that
people play the game of ‘trade,’ rather than ‘steal,’ although crime may often
pay the rational lawbreaker who always chooses dominant strategies. Nor does
non-selﬁsh behavior in ordinary market transactions prevent those transac-
tions from promoting specialization and creating wealth.
Cultures that have evolved markets have enormously expanded resource
specialization, created commensurate gains from exchange, and are wealth-
ier than those that have not. This proposition says nothing about the necessi-
ty of human selﬁshness–the increased wealth of particular individuals can be
used for consumption, investment, to pay taxes, for Macarthur Fellows, gifted
3 Economists are largely untouched by Smith’s ﬁrst great work, which was eclipsed by the Wealth
of Nations. Thus, one of the profession’s best known historian of economic thought, “found
these two works in some measure basically inconsistent,” Viner (1991). For a contrary interpre-
tation see Smith (1998). Many of the references herein to my own and co-authored work have
been reprinted in Smith (1991, 2000).
4 That A implies B in no sense allows the reverse statement. But why would we economists confuse
necessary with sufﬁcient conditions? The text from Hume provides the answer. No one can consis-
tently apply rational logical principles to everything he or she does; if there are cognitive costs in
every application then the effort cost will often exceed the beneﬁts. (Smith and Szidarovszky (2002).
Theorists live by proving theorems, and when in this mode we rarely make such errors. A missing
chapter in the study of bounded rationality is its application to understanding, and accepting with a
little humility, the severe limitations it imposes on our development of economic theory.
5 North (1981) has emphasized the importance of ideology in promoting economic growth.504
to the symphony, the Smithsonian, or the poor.6 Markets economize on the
need for virtue, but do not eliminate it.
Research in economic psychology7 has prominently reported examples
where ‘fairness’ considerations are said to contradict the rationality assump-
tions of the standard socio-economic science model, or SSSM. But experi-
mental economists have reported mixed results on rationality: people are of-
ten better (e.g. in two-person anonymous interactions), in agreement with
(e.g. in ﬂow supply and demand markets), or worse (e.g. in asset trading), in
achieving gains for themselves and others than is predicted by rational analy-
sis. Patterns in these contradictions and conﬁrmations provide important
clues to the implicit rules or norms that people may follow, and can motivate
new theoretical hypotheses for examination in both the ﬁeld and the labora-
tory. The pattern of results greatly modiﬁes the prevailing, and I believe mis-
guided, rational SSSM, and richly modernizes the unadulterated message of
the Scottish philosophers.
I. ON TWO FORMS OF RATIONALITY 
The organizing principle throughout this paper is the simultaneous existence
of two rational orders. I shall try to make the case that both orders are distin-
guishing characteristics of what we are as social creatures; that both are es-
sential to understanding and unifying a large body of experience from socio-
economic life and the experimental laboratory, and in charting relevant new
directions for economic theory as well as experimental-empirical programs.
Constructivist rationality 
The ﬁrst concept of a rational order derives from the SSSM going back to the
seventeenth century. The SSSM is an example of what Hayek has called con-
structivist rationality (or ‘constructivism’), which stems particularly from
Descartes (also Bacon and Hobbes),8 who believed and argued that all worth-
6 In the Potlatch, some wealth–created in part by private property rights in ﬁshing grounds–was
publicly destroyed.
7 I will use the term ‘economic psychology’ generally to refer to cognitive psychology as it has
been applied to economic questions, and to a third sub-ﬁeld of experimental methods in eco-
nomics recently product-differentiated as ‘behavioral economics,’ (Mullainathan and Thaler,
2001), and further differentiated into ‘behavioral game theory.’ (Camerer, 2002, in press); the
original foundations were laid by W. Edwards, D. Kahneman, A. Rappoport, P. Slovic and A.
Tversky to name some of the most prominent.
8 In the 19th century Bentham and John Stuart Mill were among the leading constructivists.
Bentham (and the utilitarians) sought to “…remake the whole of…(British)…law and institutions
on rational principles.” (Hayek, 1960, p 174). Mill introduced the much-abused constructivist con-
cept of (but not the name) ‘natural monopoly’. To Mill it was transparently wasteful and duplicative
to have two or more mail carriers operating on the same route. He is the intellectual father of the
U.S. and other postal monopolies around the world, their resistance to innovation, and their demise
in the face of the privatization movement in some countries and the growth of superior substitutes
in others. Mill could not imagine that it would be efﬁcient for two cities to be connected by two par-
allel railroad tracks. (Mill, 1848/1900, Vol 1, p 131, p 141–2, Vol 2, p 463 ). Mill died in 1873. I would
conjecture that by that date, or soon thereafter, men with grade school educations had become rich
constructing the ﬁrst parallel route railroads. These emergent contradictions to constructivist nat-
ural monopoly are examples of what we shall call ecological rationality, as detailed below.505
while social institutions were and should be created by conscious deductive
processes of human reason.9 In economics the SSSM leads to rational predic-
tive models of decision that motivate research hypotheses that experimental-
ists have been testing in the laboratory since mid twentieth century. Although
the test results tend to be conﬁrming in impersonal market exchange, the re-
sults are famously and recalcitrantly mixed in ‘personal exchange,’ notably in
a great variety of two person extensive form games where some half of the
people attempt and frequently succeed when risking cooperation, even when
anonymously paired.10 These results have motivated constructivist extensions
of game theory based on other-regarding, in addition to own-regarding, pref-
erences (e.g. Bolton, 1991; Rabin, 1993), and on ‘learning’–the idea that the
predictions of the SSSM might be approached over time by trial-and-error
adaptation processes (Erev and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999).
An alternative and perhaps complimentary explanation of some of these
contradictions to theory is that people may use social-grown norms of trust
and reciprocity11 (including equity, meaning to each according to his justly
earned desert; i.e., equality of opportunity, not outcome) to achieve cooper-
ative states superior to individually rational defection outcomes. We will re-
port some experimental tests designed to separate competing preference and
reciprocity theories of behavior in personal exchange. Although reciprocity
seems to be a leader in the comparisons we summarize, its strength is not uni-
form across all tests, and much remains to be learned about the hidden re-
cesses of meaning in human behavior and the circumstances in which coop-
erative or non-cooperative behavior is manifest.12 Technically, the issue is how
most productively to model agent ‘types’ by extending game theory so that
types are an integral part of its predictive content, rather than merely im-
ported as an ex post technical explanation of experimental results. For ex-
ample, moves can signal types, and effect decision, which explains why game
9 “…Descartes contended that all the useful human institutions were and ought to be deliberate
creation(s) of conscious reason…a capacity of the mind to arrive at the truth by a deductive
process from a few obvious and undoubtable premises.” (Hayek, 1967, p 85).
10 Behavioral economists have made a cottage industry of showing that the SSSM assumptions
seem to apply almost nowhere to real decisions. This is because their research program has been
a deliberate search in the tails of distributions for “Identifying the ways in which behavior differs
from the standard model…” (Mullainathan and Thaler 2001), a search that can only succeed.
11 Dissatisﬁed with the utilitarian approach because its predictions fail to account for the ob-
served importance of instructions/procedures, we began investigating the reciprocity hypothesis
in Hoffman, et al. (1994). Mechanically, utilities can serve as intermediate placeholders for reci-
procal trust, but, as surface indicators, serve poorly to generate new hypotheses designed to un-
derstand interactive processes. Good theory must be an engine for generating testable hypothe-
ses, and utility theory runs out of fuel quickly. Utility values are seen as providing the ultimate
‘given’ data, and the conversation stops.
12 I am reminded of a department head from Hewlett-Packard visiting our lab. I naively assumed
that he would be most interested in demonstrations of some of our market experiments. Not so.
He was more interested in the ‘trust’ experiments. Why? He saw the HP management problem as
one of getting teams to cooperate internally by building trust and trustworthiness, while being
vigorous competitors externally. Could the trust games serve as a measurement and teaching tool
for helping to solve this problem? This nicely illustrates the tension in Hayek’s two-worlds quote
in the text.506
form matters, and why payoffs available, but foregone, can effect outcomes.
These elements must be part of the internal structure of the theory such that
outcomes become predictions conditional on the elementary characteristics
of players who read each other’s intentions. If successful, many of the basic
results in game theory would become special cases of the extended theory.
In market experiments–where cooperation can occur through the coordi-
nation function of prices produced by, but simultaneously resulting from, in-
teraction with individual choice behavior–the results are more commonly in
accord with standard competitive models that maximize group welfare. This
professional victory is hollowed by the failure of standard theory to predict
the ‘surprisingly’13 weak conditions under which the results obtain.14
Thus, for tractability, Cartesian rationalism provisionally assumes or ‘re-
quires’ agents to possess complete payoff and other information – far more
than could ever be given to one mind. In economics the resulting exercises
are believed to sharpen economic thinking, as if-then parables. Yet, these as-
sumptions are unlikely to approximate the level of ignorance that has condi-
tioned either individual behavior, or our evolved institutions, as abstract
norms or rules independent of particular parameters, which have survived as
part of the world of experience.15 The temptation is to ignore this reality be-
cause it is poorly understood, and does not yield to our familiar but inade-
quate modeling tools, and to proceed in the implicit belief that our parables
capture what is most essential about what we observe. Having sharpened our
understanding on Cartesian complete information parables we carry these
tools into the world for application without all the necessary caveats that re-
ﬂect the tractability constraints imposed by our bounded professional cogni-
tive capacities as theorists.
In summary, constructivism uses reason to deliberately create rules of ac-
tion, and create human socioeconomic institutions that yield outcomes
deemed preferable, given particular circumstances, to those produced by al-
ternative arrangements. Although constructivism is one of the crowning
13 Wilson, (1992, p 256) discusses an efﬁciency theorem, and suggests that the phenomenon is
‘perhaps unsurprising.’ It is, nowadays, but few believe it; also, theory has lagged well behind the
evidence, and yields inadequate testable insight into the process dynamics operating in different
institutions.
14 I want to acknowledge correspondence with Charles Plott and add the following: Although this
is a giant victory for the economic theory of markets it simultaneously demonstrates that the the-
ory is incomplete. The unexpectedly weak conditions under which the results obtain are good
news for market performance, but not such good news for the scientiﬁc community because it
demonstrates that we do not understand why markets work as they do. You do not have to have
large numbers of agents, each an insigniﬁcant part of the whole–3 or 4 buyers and as many sell-
ers is entirely adequate in a wide range of economic environments; they do not have to have com-
plete or perfect or common information–each can have only private information; nor is it re-
quired that individuals make decisions systematically, or be economically sophisticated. 
15 Throughout the paper I will use ‘environment’ to mean the collection of agent values (prefer-
ences) that deﬁne the gains from trade; ‘institution’ to refer to the language (messages), rules of
message exchange and contract in a market; and ‘behavior’ for agent message choices condi-
tional on the environment and institution. (Smith, 1982).507
achievements of the human intellect, it is important to remain sensitive to
the fact that human institutions and most decision making is not guided pri-
marily, if at all, by constructivism. Emergent arrangements, even if initially
constructivist in form, must have survival properties that take account of op-
portunity costs and environmental challenges invisible to our modeling ef-
forts.
Limitations and distractions of constructivist rationality 
Since our theories and thought processes about social systems involve the
conscious and deliberate use of reason, it is necessary to constantly remind
ourselves that human activity is diffused and dominated by unconscious, au-
tonomic, neuropsychological systems that enable people to function effec-
tively without always calling upon the brain’s scarcest resource– attentional
and reasoning circuitry. This is an important economizing property of how
the brain works. If it were otherwise, no one could get through the day under
the burden of the selfconscious monitoring and planning of every trivial ac-
tion in detail.16 Also, no one can express in thoughts, let alone words, all that
he or she knows, and does not know but might call upon, or need to discover,
for some purposive action. Imagine the strain on the brain’s resources if at
the supermarket a shopper were required to explicitly evaluate his prefer-
ences for every combination of the tens of thousands of grocery items that
are feasible for a given budget. Such mental processes are enormously op-
portunity-costly and implicitly our brain knows, if our conscious mind does
not know, that we must avoid incurring opportunity costs that are not worth
the beneﬁt.17 The challenge of any unfamiliar action or problem appears ﬁrst
to trigger a search by the brain to bring to the conscious mind what one
knows that is related to the decision context. Context triggers autobiograph-
ic experiential memory, which explains why context surfaces as a nontrivial
treatment, particularly in small group experiments. The brain (including the
entire neurophysiological system) takes over directly in the case of familiar,
mastered tasks, and plays the equivalent of lightening chess when the ‘expert’
16 “If we stopped doing everything for which we do not know the reason, or for which we cannot
provide a justiﬁcation…we would probably soon be dead.” Hayek (1988, p 68).
17 Expected utility theory is for teaching (as Wassily Leontief once suggested), but also for the
constructivist modeling of consistent choice. It seems inadequate for the prediction, or the eco-
logical understanding, of behavior. Its inadequacy for prediction has been plainly emphasized in
the many contributions of Tversky and Kahneman (see their 1986 paper for an excellent sum-
mary statement), some of which have been qualiﬁed and reinterpreted in the work of
Gigerenzer, et al. (1999). The results are far more encouraging in the context of markets, where
subjects are not consciously maximizing. See, e.g. Smith (1991, 2000) and Plott (2001). Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe (1994), in a signiﬁcant paper, ﬁnd that the measurement of risk aversion
varies with the type of market institution or procedure used in extracting risk measures from de-
cisions. See Smith and Szidarovszky (2002) for a constructivist utilitarian treatment of decision
whose reward outcome requires cognitive costs to be incurred: objective rationality is not sub-
jectively rational, and therefore it is not optimal for the individual to apply the objectively ‘opti-
mal’ prescriptions.508
trades, plays Beethoven’s Fifth piano concerto, or connects with a 95
mile/hour fast ball–all without self aware ‘thinking’ by the mind.
We fail utterly to possess natural mechanisms for reminding ourselves of
the brain’s ofﬂine activities and accomplishments. This important proposi-
tion has led Gazzaniga (1998) to ask why the brain fools the mind into be-
lieving it is in control.18 And to Hayek, who thoroughly understood this
proposition, what was the ‘fatal conceit’? “The idea that the ability to acquire
skills stems from reason.” The constructivist mind makes a fatal ‘error,’ blind-
ing itself to understanding, as we are warned, “one should never suppose that
our reason is in the higher critical position and that only those moral rules
are valid that reason endorses.” (Hayek, 1988, p 21). But the anthropocentric
(- morphic) mind routinely makes this signiﬁcant error.
Most of our operating knowledge19 we do not remember learning. Natural
language is the most prominent example, but also music and virtually every-
thing that constitutes our developmental socialization. We learn the rules of
a language and of efﬁcient social intercourse, without explicit instruction,
simply by exposure to family and extended family social networks. (Pinker,
1994; Kagan and Lamb, 1987; Kagan, 1994; Fiske, 1991). 
That the brain is capable of off-line subconscious learning is shown by ex-
periments with amnesiacs who are taught a new task. They learn to perform
well, but memory of having learned the task escapes them. (Knowlton,
Mangels, and Squire, 1996).
Ecological rationality 
These considerations lead to the second concept of a rational order, as an un-
designed ecological system that emerges out of cultural and biological evolu-
tionary20 processes: home grown principles of action, norms, traditions, and
18 “By the time we think we know something – it is part of our conscious experience – the brain
has already done its work. It is old news to the brain, but fresh to ‘us.’ Systems built into the brain
do their work automatically and largely outside of our conscious awareness. The brain ﬁnishes
the work half a second before the information it processes reaches our consciousness . . . We are
clueless about how all this works and gets effected. We don’t plan or articulate these actions. We
simply observe the output . . . The brain begins to cover for this ‘done deal’ aspect of its func-
tioning by creating in us the illusion that the events we are experiencing are happening in real
time – not before our conscious experience of deciding to do something.” (Gazzaniga, 1998, pp.
63–64).
19 Hayek (1967, p 44) notes that “…modern English usage does not permit generally to employ
the verb ‘can’ (in the sense of the German können) to describe all those instances in which an
individual merely ‘knows how’ to do a thing...(including)… the capacity to act according to rules
which we may be able to discover but which we need not be able to state in order to obey them.”
20 Many recognize that evolutionary processes are necessarily co-evolutionary, but there is also
deep denial of this, and bias, that all is due to ‘culture’ (which is even more poorly understood
than biology), leading Pinker (2002) to investigate why. Heritable abstract function can become
dormant, atrophied or mal-functional in the absence of initializing input on a developmental
time schedule for the brain’s vision, language and socialization circuitry. That these processes are
co-evolutionary is evident in the study of twins (Segal, 1999). Deconstructivist reports argue that
these studies exhibit many of the usual data and statistical identiﬁcation problems (Goldberger,
1979), but the need is for positive revisionist analysis.509
‘morality’.21 Ecological rationality uses reason– rational reconstruction–to ex-
amine the behavior of individuals based on their experience and folk knowl-
edge, who are ‘naïve’ in their ability to apply constructivist tools to the deci-
sions they make; to understand the emergent order in human cultures; to
discover the possible intelligence embodied in the rules, norms and institu-
tions of our cultural and biological heritage that are created from human in-
teractions but not by deliberate human design. People follow rules without
being able to articulate them, but they can be discovered. This is the intellec-
tual heritage of the Scottish philosophers, who described and interpreted the
social and economic order they observed.
An eighteenth century precursor of Herbert Simon, David Hume was con-
cerned with the limits of reason, the bounds on human understanding, and
with scaling back the exaggerated claims of Cartesian constructivism. To
Hume, rationality was phenomena that reason discovers in emergent institu-
tions. Thus, “the rules of morality…are not conclusions of (our) reason.”
(Hume, 1739/1985, II, 235). Adam Smith developed the idea of emergent or-
der for economics. Truth is discovered in the form of the intelligence em-
bodied in rules and traditions that have formed, inscrutably, out of the an-
cient history of human social interactions. This is the antithesis of the
anthropocentric belief that if an observed social mechanism is functional,
somebody in the unrecorded past must have used reason consciously to cre-
ate it to serve its perceived intended purposes.22
In experimental economics the eighteenth century Scottish tradition is re-
vealed in the observation of emergent order in numerous studies of existing
market institutions such as the continuous double auction (CDA).23 To para-
21 ‘Morality’ refers to any maxim of cohesive social behavior that survives the test of time, and is
prominently represented by the great ‘shalt not’ prohibitions of the leading world religions: thou
shalt not: (1) steal, (2) covet the possessions of others, commit (3) murder, (4) adultery or (5)
bear false witness. The ﬁrst two deﬁne and defend property rights in the product of one’s labor,
and all resources accumulated by such labor, enabling the emergence of the extended order of
mind through markets. The last three commandments protect the sanctity of social
exchange–the external order of the mind. These modest exclusionary constraints leave an im-
mense scope for freedom within their bounds. Corollaries, like the Buddhist live-and-let-live ver-
sion of the golden rule, are explicit in this respect: “do not unto others as you would have them
not do unto you.” 
22 In cultural and biological evolution, order arises from mechanisms for generating variation to
which is applied mechanisms for selection. I am indebted to Todd Zywicki, who, at a recent
Liberty Fund conference on ‘Hayek, Experiment and Freedom,’ observed that reason is good at
providing variation, but not selection. Constructivism is indeed an engine for generating varia-
tion, but is far too limited in its ability to comprehend and apply all the relevant facts to serve the
process of selection, which is better left to ecological processes.
23 What experimentalists have unintentionally brought to the table is a methodology for objec-
tively testing the Scottish-Hayekian hypotheses under scientiﬁc controls. This answers the ques-
tion Milton Friedman is said to have raised concerning the validity of Hayek’s theory/reasoning:
“how would you know?” (I am unable to provide a reference). Economic historians e.g. North
(1981), and political economists, e.g. Elinor Ostrom (1982), have long explored the intelligence
and efﬁcacy embodied in emergent socioeconomic institutions that solve, or fail to solve, prob-
lems of growth and resource management. They study ‘natural’ ecological experiments from
which we have learned immeasurably.510
phrase Adam Smith, people in these experiments are led to promote group
welfare enhancing social ends that are not part of their intention. This prin-
ciple is supported by hundreds of experiments whose environments and in-
stitutions (sealed bid, posted offer and others besides CDA) may exceed the
capacity of formal game theoretic analysis to articulate predictive models. But
they do not exceed the functional capacity of collectives of incompletely in-
formed human decision makers, whose autonomic mental algorithms coor-
dinate behavior through the rules of the institution–social algorithms–to gen-
erate high levels of measured performance.
Acknowledging and investigating the workings of unseen processes are es-
sential to the growth of our understanding of social phenomena, and enable
us to probe beyond the anthropocentric limitations of constructivism.
Both kinds of rationality have inﬂuenced the design and interpretation of
experiments in economics. Thus, if people in certain contexts make choices
that contradict our formal theory of rationality, rather than conclude that
they are irrational, some ask why, reexamine maintained hypotheses includ-
ing all aspects of the experiments–procedures, payoffs, context, instructions,
etc.–and inquire as to what new concepts and experimental designs can help
us to better understand the behavior. What is the subjects’ perception of the
problem that they are trying to solve?
Finally, understanding decision requires knowledge beyond the traditional
bounds of economics,24 a challenge to which Hume and Smith were not
strangers.25 This is manifest in the recent studies of the neural correlates of
strategic interaction (Kevin McCabe calls it neuroeconomics) using fMRI and
other brain imaging technologies. That research explores the neurocorre-
leates of intentions or “mind reading,” and other hypotheses about informa-
tion, choice, and own versus other payoffs in determining interactive behav-
ior.
The above themes will be illustrated and discussed in a wide variety of ex-
amples drawn from economics, law, experimental economics and psychology.
I will begin with impersonal exchange through markets, drawing on the
learning from experiments and ﬁeld observations to illustrate how the con-
trast between constructive and ecological rationality informs learning from
observation. Then I will examine personal exchange, particularly in the con-
text of two person extensive form games, asking why constructivist models are
of limited success in predicting behavior in single play games, even when sub-
jects are anonymously matched.
24 I importune students to read narrowly within economics, but widely in science. Within eco-
nomics there is essentially only one model to be adapted to every application: optimization sub-
ject to constraints due to resource limitations, institutional rules and /or the behavior of others,
as in Cournot-Nash equilibria. The economic literature is not the best place to ﬁnd new inspira-
tion beyond these traditional technical methods of modeling.
25 Thus, for Hayek, “an economist who is only an economist cannot be a good economist.” 511
II. IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THE EXTENDED ORDER 
OF THE MARKET 
How are the two concepts of a rational order related?
Constructivism takes as given the social structures generated by emergent in-
stitutions that we observe in the world, and proceeds to model it formally. An
example would be the Dutch auction or its alleged isomorphic equivalent,
the sealed bid auction. (Vickery, 1961; Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
Constructivist models need not ask why or how an auction institution arose or
what were the ecological conditions that created it; or why there are so many
distinct auction institutions. In some cases it is the other way around. Thus,
revenue equivalence theorems show that the standard auctions generate
identical expected outcomes, which, if taken literally, leave no modeled eco-
nomic reason for choosing between them.
More generally, using rational theory, one represents an observed socio-
economic situation with an abstract interactive game tree. Contrarily, the eco-
logical concept of rationality asks from whence came the structure captured
by the tree? Why this social practice, from which we can abstract a particular
game, and not another? Were there other practices and associated game trees
that lacked survival properties and were successfully invaded by what we ob-
serve? There is a sense in which ecological systems, whether cultural or bio-
logical, must necessarily be, or are in the process of becoming, rational: they
serve the ﬁtness needs of those who unintentionally created them through
their interactions. Constructivist mental models are based on assumptions
about behavior, structure and the value-knowledge environment. These as-
sumptions might be correct, incorrect or irrelevant, and the models may or
may not lead to rational action in the sense of serving well the needs of those
to whom the models apply. As theorists the professional charge for which we
are paid is to formulate and prove theorems. A theorem is a mapping from as-
sumptions into testable or observable implications. The demands of tractabil-
ity loom large in this exercise, and to get anything much in the way of results
it is necessary to consider both the assumptions and their implications as vari-
ables. Few game theorists, building on the assumption that agents always
choose dominant strategies, believed this to characterize the behavior of all
agents in all situations. Hence, the near universal justiﬁcation of theory as an
exercise in ‘understanding.’ But the temptation is to believe that our ‘castles
in the sky’ (as W. Brock would say) have direct meaning in our worlds of ex-
perience and proceed to impose them where it may not be ecologically ratio-
nal to do so.
To understand what is–the tip of the knowledge iceberg–requires under-
standing of a great deal that is not. In the laboratory we can not only ratio-
nally reconstruct counterfactuals, as in economic history, but also use expe-
riments to test and examine their properties. Let us look at two
contemporary examples.Deregulating Airline Routes 
Airline route deregulation brought an unanticipated reorganization of the
network, called the hub-and-spoke system. (See e.g., Donahue, 2002). This is
an ecologically rational response, apparently anticipated by none of the con-
structivist arguments for deregulation, and predicted by no one. Nor could it
have been uncovered, I submit, in 1978 by surveys of airline managers, or by
marketing surveys of airline customers. Unknown to both managers and cus-
tomers was the subsequently revealed decision preferences of customers who
unknowingly favored frequency of daily departure and arrival times–a prefer-
ence that had to be discovered through market experimentation. Nonstop
service between secondary cities was simply not sustainable in a deregulated
world of free choice. The only way to achieve efﬁciency, both the demand for
frequency of service and proﬁtable load factors, among secondary cities was
for the ﬂights to connect through hubs. Hence, the hypothesis that a rational
ecological equilibrium emerged to dominate repeated constructivist at-
tempts, by business entrants and start-ups, to satisfy an incompatible set of
constraints provided by the microstructure of demand, proﬁtability and tech-
nology.
Might it have been otherwise if airport runway rights, or ‘slots’, had been
an integral part of the deregulation of airline routes, and the time-of-day spot
pricing of slots had emerged to reﬂect hub congestion costs? (Rassenti, Smith
and Bulﬁn, 1982). We do not know, but the effect of this hypothetical coun-
terfactual on the viability of hub bypass could be assessed in laboratory ex-
periments. As in all studies of what is not, the challenge is to estimate the pa-
rameters that would implement the appropriate economic environment.
The California Energy Crisis 
A second, and very troubling, example is the circumstances leading to the
California energy crisis. As in other regions of the country and the world,
deregulation was effected as a planned transition with numerous political
compromises. In California it took the form of deregulating wholesale mar-
kets and prices while continuing to regulate retail prices at ﬁxed hourly rates
over the daily and seasonal cycles in consumption. The utilities negotiated an
increase in these average retail rates to meet the revenue requirements of
capital investments that were ‘stranded’ (i.e., were believed to be unable to
recover their costs under competition). This preoccupation with the past,
and with average revenue/cost thinking by regulators and regulated alike, ill
prepared the state for the consequences of having no dynamic mechanisms
for prioritizing the end use consumption of power.
As expected, traditional volatility in the marginal cost of generated elec-
tricity was immediately translated into volatile intra-day wholesale prices.
What was not expected was that a combination of low rainfall (reducing
Paciﬁc Northwest hydroelectric output), growth in demand, unseasonably
hot weather, generators down on normal maintenance schedules, etc., caused
the temporary normal daily peaking of prices to be greatly accentuated, and
to be much more lasting than had occurred earlier in the Midwest and South.
512513
Events of small probability happen at about the expected frequency, and
since there are many such events the unexpected is not that unlikely.
Constructivist planning failed to provide for retail competition to experiment
with programs allowing consumers to save money by enabling their lower pri-
ority uses of power to be interrupted in times of supply stress. Interruptible
deliveries are a direct substitute for both energy supply and energy reserves,
and are an essential means of assuring adequate capacity and reserves that
cover all the various supply contingencies faced by the industry.
Because of the regulatory mandate that all demand must be served at a
ﬁxed price, the planning did not allow for the early introduction of demand
responsive retail prices and technologies to enable peak consumption to be
reduced. Instead of mechanism design we had ﬁxed retail price ‘design’ to
generate average revenue that was supposed to cover average cost, and it
failed. The regulatory thought process is as follows: the function of price is to
provide revenue, and the function of revenue is to cover cost. But this is the
antithesis of the market function of price. For neither management nor the
regulators was it natural to think in terms of proﬁting from selling less power.
Yet that was precisely the route by which the California distributors could
have avoided the loss of an estimated $15 billion: every peak kilowatt-hour
not sold at the average retail rate would have saved up to ten times that
amount of energy cost. Static technology, and the utter fantasy that all load
can always be served, were protected from innovation by the legally fran-
chised local wires monopoly. An entrant could not seek to win customers by
offering discounts for switching from peak to off peak consumption, and, at
the entrant’s investment risk, installing the required control devices on end-
use appliances. This legacy–long entrenched, and jealously sheltered by local
franchised monopolies after deregulation–gave California dispatchers no al-
ternative but to trap people in elevators and shut down high-end computer
programming facilities at critical times of peak power shortage.
All power delivery systems are vulnerable to a combination of unfavorable
events that will produce short supplies at peak demand. Constructivism
alone, without competitive trial-and-error ecological experimentation with re-
tail delivery technologies and consumer preferences, cannot design mecha-
nisms that process all the distributed knowledge that individuals either pos-
sess or will discover, and that is relevant to ﬁnding an efﬁcient mix of both
demand and supply responsiveness.26
26 This is illustrated by a November 6, 2002 press release by Puget Sound Energy. “PSE Proposes
to End Pilot Time-of-Use Program Ahead of Schedule: PSE’s time-of-use (TOU) program was cre-
ated in 2000 during the energy crisis and was intended to provide ﬁnancial incentives for cus-
tomers to shift some of their electricity consumption to less expensive, off-peak times of the day.
The program was restructured in July 2002 to reﬂect a calmer energy market. Since that time it
has resulted in most participants’ bills being slightly higher than on ﬂat rates…Reynolds (a PSE
spokesman) said, ‘However, when exploring new territory, you need to be able to recognize
when the program is not working as you had hoped…and begin a rigorous analysis of the pro-
gram and how it could be successfully restructured for the future energy marketplace.’” It is be-
cause no one knows what will work best that you have to open retailing up to the ﬁeld experi-514
Economic Systems Design 
What can we learn from experiments about how demand responsiveness
could impact energy shortages as in the California crisis? Rassenti, Smith and
Wilson (2002a) measure this impact by creating a market in which a modest
and achievable 16% of peak retail demand can be interrupted voluntarily at
discount prices by wholesale energy providers. In the experiments, demand
cycles through four levels each ‘day’ and is expressed in the wholesale market
with two contrasting experimental treatments: (1) robot buyers who reveal all
demand at the spot market clearing price; (2) four proﬁt motivated human
buyers who are free to bid strategically in the market to obtain the lowest
available prices. In each case bids to supply power are entered by ﬁve proﬁt
motivated human suppliers. In the passive demand treatment prices average
much above the benchmark competitive equilibrium, and are very volatile. In
the treatment with human buyers, prices approach the competitive equilibri-
um, and price volatility becomes minuscule. By empowering wholesale buy-
ers, in addition to sellers, to bid strategically in their own interest, even
though 84% of peak demand is ‘must serve,’ buyers are able to effectively dis-
cipline sellers and hold prices at competitive levels.27
This example illustrates the use of the laboratory in economic systems de-
sign. In these exercises we can test-bed alternative market auction rules and
ment called “free entry and exit.” One experimental possibility is a contract that would share the
inheritently unknown and unpredictable savings with the customer. When a total cannot be
known in advance, use a proportionality rule. New Zealand’s tradable ﬁsh catch quotas were orig-
inally speciﬁed in quantities, and were redesigned as proportions of the changing quantity avail-
able. (Oral communication with Maurice McTigue, 2002). An advantage of laboratory experi-
ments is that these kinds of errors are exposed, and corrective alternatives tested, at very low cost.
27 The most widely agreed upon design failure in the California crisis was the rule preventing the
distribution utilities from engaging in long term contracts to supply power. (Wilson, 2002, p.
1332). Beware this simplistic popular explanation: it is a two-wrongs-make-a-right argument: yes,
of course, given that you were going to protect the monopoly power of the distribution utilities
to tie the rental of the wires to the metering and sale of energy at a ﬁxed regulated price, then
one way to protect them temporarily from the consequent wholesale price volatility might be to
encourage long term contracts at a ﬁxed average delivery cost. But suppliers will want higher
prices and/or short-term contracts if they anticipate shortages–you cannot get blood out of a
turnip; long contracts work to lower cost only to the extent that suppliers are surprised by high
spot prices, but when it comes time to renegotiate expiring contracts they will not replicate the
error. California discovered this when they intervened to sign long-term contracts, and encoun-
tered high prices. This whole argument turns the design problem on its head. You must (1) re-
move the legal power of the local wires monopoly to prevent competing energy suppliers from
contracting with customers to discount off-peak energy, charge premiums for peak energy, and
install the supporting control devices; (2) let this competition determine the dynamic price
structure, and investment required to implement it; (3) simultaneously, let ﬁnancial instruments
evolve to hedge whatever risk is left over as prices become less volatile. Financial instruments can
hedge price volatility, not load volatility. Only demand responsive interruptible loads can relieve
supply stress and provide the demand side reserves that reduce the risk of lost load. No one mind
or collective can anticipate and plan the needed mix of technologies to enable the market to
manage demand. Therefore it is essential to remove all entry barriers, and allow ﬁrms to exper-
iment through competition to discover and innovate efﬁcient ways of organizing retail delivery
systems. Claims that short run retail demand is ‘notoriously’ inelastic miss the point: how would
you know if loan-shedding technology is inﬂexible? Competition and incentives to innovate have
never been part of the structure.515
the effect of transmission constraints on generator supply behavior
(Backermanet al., 2001), vary the degree of market concentration, or ‘power’
in a non-convex environment (Dentinet al., 2001), compare the effect of
more or less strategic demand responsiveness (Rassenti, Smith and Wilson,
2002a), study network and multiple market effects also in a non-convex envi-
ronment (Olson et al., 2003), and test bed markets to inform, but not ﬁnalize,
market liberalization policy (Rassenti, Smith and Wilson, 2002b). For a survey
of many examples, see McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith (1991).
The two types of rational order are both expressed in the experimental
methodology developed for economic systems design. This branch of experi-
mental economics uses the lab as a test bed to examine the performance of
proposed new institutions, and modiﬁes their rules and implementation fea-
tures in the light of the test results. The proposed designs are initially con-
structivist, although most applications, such as the design of electricity mar-
kets or auctions for spectrum licenses, are far too complicated for formal
analysis. (Rassenti, Smith and Wilson, 2002a; Banks, et al., 2003).
But when a design is modiﬁed in the light of test results, the modiﬁcations
tested, modiﬁed again, retested, and so on, one is using the laboratory to ef-
fect an evolutionary adaptation as in the ecological concept of a rational or-
der. If the ﬁnal result is implemented in the ﬁeld, it certainly undergoes fur-
ther evolutionary change in the light of practice, and of operational forces
not tested in the experiments because they were unknown, or beyond current
laboratory technology.28 In fact this evolutionary process is essential if institu-
tions, as dynamic social tools, are to be adaptive and responsive to changing
conditions. How can such ﬂexibility be made part of their design? We do not
know because no one can foresee what changes will be needed.
Market Institutions and Performance 
Non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash competitive equilibrium (CE) theory has
conventionally offered two speciﬁcations concerning the preconditions for
achieving a CE: (1) agents require complete, or ‘perfect’, information on the
equations deﬁning the CE; also common knowledge–all must know that all
know that all know that they have this information. In this way all agents have
common expectations of a CE and their behavior must necessarily produce it;
(2) another tradition, popularly articulated in textbooks, and showing, per-
haps, more sensitivity for plausibility, has argued for a weaker requirement
that agents need only be price takers in the market.
The alleged ‘requirement’ of complete, common or perfect information is
vacuous: I know of no predictive theorem stating that when agents have such
information their behavior produces a CE, and in its absence their behavior
28 People often ask, What are the limits of laboratory investigation? I think any attempt to deﬁne
such limits is very likely to be bridged by the subsequent ingenuity and creativity (the primary
barriers at any one time) of some experimentalist. Twenty-ﬁve years ago I could not have imag-
ined being able to do the kinds of experiments that today have become routine in our laborato-
ries. Experimentalists also include many of us who see no clear border separating the lab and the
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fails to produce a CE. If such a theorem existed, it could help us to design the
experiments that could test these dichotomous predictions. I suggest that the
idea that agents need complete information is derived from introspective er-
ror: as theorists we need complete information to calculate the CE. But this is
not a theory of how information or its absence causes agent behavior to yield
or not a CE. It is simply an unmotivated statement declaring, without evi-
dence, that every agent is a constructivist in exactly the same sense as are we
as theorists. And the claim that it is ‘as if’ agents had complete information,
helps not a wit to understand the wellsprings of behavior. What is missing are
models of the process whereby agents go from their initial circumstances, and
dispersed information, using the algorithms of the institution to update their
status, and converge (or not) to the predicted equilibrium.29
As a theory the price-taking parable is also a non-starter: who makes price
if all agents take price as given? If it is the Walrasian auctioneer, why have
such processes been found to be so inefﬁcient? (Bronfman, et al., 1996).
Hundreds of experiments in the past 40 years (Smith, 1962, 1982; Davis
and Holt, 1993; Kagel and Roth, 1995; Plott, 2001) demonstrate that com-
plete information is not necessary for a CE to form out of a self-ordering in-
teraction between agent behavior and the rules of information exchange and
contract in a variety of different institutions, but most prominently in the con-
tinuous bid/ask double auction (CDA).30 That complete information also
29 The inherent difﬁculty in equilibrium modeling of the CDA is shown by the fact that so few
have even attempted. Wilson (1985, 1987), characteristically, has had the courage and compe-
tence to log progress. Friedman (1984) uses an unconventional no-congestion assumption to ﬁ-
nesse Nash-Cournot analysis, concluding efﬁciency and a ﬁnal competitive clearing price. Wilson
(1987) uses standard assumptions of what is common knowledge– number of buyers (sellers),
each with inelastic demand (supply) for one unit, preferences linear in payoffs, no risk aversion
or wealth effects, valuations jointly distributed, and agent capacity to “compute equilibrium
strategies and select one equilibrium in a way that is common knowledge.” (p 411). This is an ab-
stract as-if-all-agents-were-game-theorists constructivist model of a thought process that no game
theorist would or does use when participating in a CDA. The model itself generates its own prob-
lems, such as degeneracy in the endgame when there is only one buyer and seller left who can
feasibly trade– a problem that is not a problem for the subjects, who do not know this, and see
imperfectly informed buyers and sellers still attempting to trade and thereby disciplining price.
Extra marginal traders provide opportunity cost endgame constraints on price. Agents need have
no understanding of opportunity cost in order for their behavior to be shaped by it. Wilson rec-
ognizes these considerations: “The crucial deﬁciencies, however, are inescapable consequences
of the game-theoretic formulation.” (1987, p 411) We are squarely up against the limitations–per-
haps the dead end ultimate consequences–of Cartesian constructivism. We have not a clue, any
more than the so-called ‘naïve’ subjects in experiments, how it is that our brains so effortlessly
solve the equilibration problem in interacting with other brains though the CDA (and other) in-
stitutions. We model not the right world to capture this important experimental ﬁnding.
30 See Ketcham, et al., (1984) for a comparison of CDA with the posted offer (PO) retail pricing
mechanism. CDA converges more rapidly and is more efﬁcient than PO. So why does not CDA
invade and displace PO? It is the high cost of training every retail clerk to be an effective nego-
tiator for the ﬁrm. Institutions reﬂect the ﬁne structure of opportunity cost, and the loss of ex-
change efﬁciency in PO is more than offset by the distributional productive efﬁciency of the mass
retailing innovation of the 1880s that led price policy to be centralized. As I write, those policies
are being modiﬁed on the internet where prices can be adjusted to the opportunity cost charac-
teristics of buyers, such as how many other internet sites they have visited. (Deck and Wilson
2002). Institutional changes in response to innovations like mass retailing are part of the emer-
gence of an ecologically rational equilibrium.517
may not be sufﬁcient for a CE is suggested (the samples are small) by com-
parisons showing that convergence is slowed or fails under complete infor-
mation in certain environments. (Smith, 1976, 1980).
An interesting contribution by Gode and Sunder (Hereafter GS; see
Sunder 2002, and the references it contains) is to demonstrate that an im-
portant component of the emergent order observed in these market experi-
ments derives from the institution, not merely the presumed rationality of the
individuals. Efﬁciency is necessarily a joint product of the rules of the institu-
tion and the behavior of agents. What Sunder and his coauthors have shown
is that in the double auction market for a single commodity (we know not yet
how far it can be generalized), efﬁciency is high even with ‘zero’ intelligence
robot agents, each of whom chooses bids (asks) completely at random from
all those that will not impose a loss on the agent. Thus, agents who are not ra-
tional constructivist proﬁt maximizers, and use no learning or updating algo-
rithms, achieve most of the possible social gains from trade using this institu-
tion. Does this example illustrate in a small way those “super-individual
structures within which individuals found great opportunities…(and
that)…could take account of more factual circumstances than individuals
could perceive, and in consequence…is in some respects superior to, or ‘wis-
er’ than, human reason…”? (Hayek, 1988, p 77, 75).
We do not know if the GS results generalize to multiple market settings as
discussed in the next paragraph. Miller (2002), however, has shown that in a
very elementary two-market environment–inter-temporally separated markets
for the same commodity–the GS results are qualiﬁed. Complex price dynam-
ics, including ‘bubbles,’ appear, and there is loss of efﬁciency, although the
loss is not substantial. On average the decline is apparently from around 94%
to 88%.
In multiple market trading in nonlinear interdependent demand environ-
ments, each individual’s maximum willingness-to-pay for a unit of commodi-
ty A depends on the price of B, and vice versa, and in this more complex
economy double auction markets also converge to the vector of CE prices
and trading volumes. A two-commodity example is reported in Smith (1986),
based on nonlinear demand (CES payoff function) and linear supply func-
tions found in Williams and Smith (1986); also see Williams, et al., (2000). In
these experiments, numerical tables based on the preference and cost infor-
mation deﬁning the general equilibrium solution of four nonlinear equations
in two prices and two quantities are dispersed among the undergraduate sub-
jects. They buy and sell units of each of the two commodities in a series of
trading periods. Prices and trading volume converge, after several trading pe-
riods, to the CE deﬁned by the nonlinear equations. The subjects would not
have a clue as to how to solve the equations mathematically. The experi-
menter applies the tools of constructivist reason to solve for the benchmark
CE, but in repeat play this ‘solution’ emerges from the spontaneous order
created by the subjects trading under the rules of the double auction market
institution. Numerous other experiments with many simultaneous interde-
pendent markets show similar patterns of convergence (Plott, 1988, 2001).The Iowa Electronic Market 
What evidence do we have that the laboratory efﬁciency properties of con-
tinuous double auction trading apply also in the ﬁeld? One of the best
sources of evidence, I believe, is found in the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM)
used widely around the world. (Forsythe, et al., 1992, 1999) These markets are
used to study the efﬁcacy of futures markets in aggregating widely dispersed
information on the outcomes of political elections, or any well deﬁned extra-
laboratory event, such as a change in the discount rate by the FED. The ‘lab-
oratory’ is the internet. The ‘subjects’ are all who log on and buy an initial
portfolio of claims on the ﬁnal event outcomes; they consist of whom ever
logs in, and are not any kind of representative or ‘scientiﬁc’ sample as in the
polls with which they are paired. The institution is the open book double auc-
tion.
In the IEM, traders make a market in shares representing pari-mutuel
claims on the popular vote (or winner-take-all) outcome of an election, ref-
erendum, etc. For example the ﬁrst IEM was on the 1988 Presidential
Election. Each person wanting to trade shares deposits a minimum sum, $35,
with the IEM and receives a trading account containing $10 cash for buying
additional shares, and ten elemental portfolios at $2.50 each, consisting of
one share of each of the candidates–Bush, Dukakis, Jackson, and ‘rest-of-
ﬁeld.’ Trading occurs continuously in an open-book bid-ask market for sever-
al months, and everyone knows that the market will be called (trading sus-
pended) in November on election day, when the dividend paid on each share
is equal to the candidate’s fraction of the popular vote times $2.50. Hence if
the ﬁnal two candidates and all others receive popular vote shares (53.2%,
45.4%, 1.4%), these proportions (times $2.50) represent the payoff to a trad-
er for each share held. Consequently, at any time t, normalizing on $1, the
price of a share (÷$2.50), reﬂects the market expectation of that candidate’s
share of the total vote. A price, $0.43 means the market predicts that the can-
didate will poll 43% of the vote. Other forms of contract that can be traded in
some IEMs include winner-take-all, or number of seats in the House, and so
on.
The IEM data set includes 49 markets, 41 worldwide elections and 13 coun-
tries. Several results stand out: the closing market prices, produced by a non-
representative sample of traders, show lower average absolute forecasting er-
ror (1.5%) than the representative exit poll samples (1.9%); in the subset of
16 national elections, the market outperforms the polls in 9 of 15 cases; in the
course of several months preceding the election outcome, the market pre-
dictions are consistently much less volatile than the polls; generally, larger
and more active markets predict better than smaller, thinner markets; surveys
of the market traders show that their share holdings are biased in favor of the
candidates they themselves prefer.
In view of this last result why do markets outperform the polls? Forsythe, et
al., (1992) argue that it’s their marginal trader hypothesis. Those who are ac-
tive in price ‘setting,’ that is, in entering limit bids or asks, are found to be less
subject to this bias, than those traders accepting (selling and buying ‘at mar-
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ket’) the limit bids and asks. Polls record unmotivated, representative, aver-
age opinion. Markets record motivated marginal opinion that cannot be de-
scribed as ‘representative.’ This analysis helps to provide a good mechanical,
if not ultimate, understanding of how human interaction with the rules of a
bid/ask CDA yield efﬁcient predictions.31
We have seen that markets economize on information, understanding, the
number of agents, and individual rationality. Can they also economize on the
need for external intervention to protect particular interests, if all are em-
powered by the trading institution to act in their individual interests?
Strategy Proof-ness: theory and behavior 
Preferences are private and unobservable, and institutions have to rely on the
messages reported by agents, not their true preferences. This follows from
the fact that no one mind has all the information known together by all those
in the market. It is therefore possible for an agent to affect prices and out-
comes in a market by strategically misreporting preferences. This prospect
has motivated the literature seeking strategy-proof mechanisms: “an alloca-
tion mechanism is strategy-proof if every agent’s utility-maximizing choice of
what preferences to report depends only on his own preferences and not on
his expectations concerning the preferences that other agents will report.”
(Satterthwaite, 1987, p. 519). This requires each agent to have a dominant
strategy to report true preferences, and has led to impossibility theorems es-
tablishing the nonexistence of such a mechanism under certain conditions.
In view of such negative theoretical results and the narrow conditions un-
der which solutions have been investigated, it is important to ask what people
actually do in experimental environments in which the experimenter induces
preferences privately on individual subjects. We know what is impossible, but
what is possible in more open-ended systems than are modeled by theory? Is
it possible that when all are free to choose from a large space of strategies,
31 Other markets besides the IEM are known to have efﬁcient information aggregating proper-
ties. Pari-mutuel racetrack markets are an example where, interestingly, the environment is much
like the IEM: the settlements occur at a well deﬁned end-state known to all agents, unlike stock
market trading where expectations ﬂoat continuously with no clear value revelation endpoint.
“The racetrack betting market is surprisingly efﬁcient. Market odds are remarkably good esti-
mates of winning probabilities. This implies (sic) that race track bettors have considerable ex-
pertise, and that the markets should be taken seriously.” (Thaler and Ziemba 1988, p 169). It is
surprising to behavioral economists because their methodology is restricted to looking for devi-
ations from the standard model. What is unusual here is that in racetracks they have found re-
portable evidence for efﬁcient outcomes. For those who follow experimental economics, IEM
and similar controlled-environment market studies, efﬁciency is not only commonplace (if not
universal), it cannot be attributed to agents with “considerable expertise.” The agents are most-
ly naïve, although they get repeat interaction experience, which, from the evidence, clearly gives
them expertise enough. But, as in the IEM and experimental markets, race track markets are not
perfect: there are inefﬁciencies in the ‘place’ and ‘show’ options and the favorite-long-shot bias,
with the latter more pronounced in the last two races of the day. Various hypotheses have been
offered to explain these inefﬁciencies, but more signiﬁcant is that computer programs have been
written to arbitrage (yielding returns of some 11% per bet), the place, show and long-shot inef-
ﬁciencies. (It is my understanding that good proﬁts have been accumulated on these programs,
so far without neutralizing the arbitrage opportunities–let the good times roll!) ecologically rational strategies will emerge that immunize against strategic
manipulation? Given that information is inherently dispersed, has society
evolved institutions in which forms of behavior arise that result in practical if
not universal solutions to the problem of strategy proof-ness?
The double auction is a well-known example yielding CE in a wide range of
economic environments including small numbers. Are there other examples,
and if there are, what are the strategic behavioral mechanisms that people
adopt to achieve strategy proof-ness?
One example is the sealed bid-offer auction: in each contract period the
submitted bids are ordered from highest to lowest, the offers (asks) from low-
est to highest, with the intersection (cross) determining the uniform clearing
price and volume exchanged. (See Cason and Friedman, Friedman, and
Wilson in Friedman and Rust (1991). Also see Smith, Williams, Bratton and
Vannoni (1982) for comparative studies of different versions of the sealed
bid-offer mechanism and the continuous double auction.
In experiments with stationary supply and demand, initially both buyers
and sellers greatly under-reveal their true individual willingness to buy or sell.
Volume is very low (10–15% of optimal), the market is inefﬁcient and each
agent can see that at the initial clearing price they are leaving money on the
table. In repeat play they increase revelation, but mostly of units near the last
period’s clearing price. As volume increases and the clearing price closes in
on the CE, the realized inverse demand and supply become very ﬂat near the
true clearing price with many tied or nearly tied bids and asks that exceed the
capacity of any single buyer or seller. At this steady state, and given this be-
havior, if anyone withholds purchases or sales she is denied an allocation as
other more competitively traded units substitute for hers. This results in a ‘be-
havioral strategy proof equilibrium.’ Such is the power of motivated, private-
ly informed agents in trial-and-error repeat interaction.
These experimental results make it plain that the theoretical condition for
a strategy-proof equilibrium–that each agent have a dominate strategy to re-
veal true willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept for all units, and not just
units near the margin–is much too strong. The above description from blind
two-sided auctions, however, also shows that there is a social cost to the
achievement of a strategy-proof equilibrium: blind two-sided auctions con-
verge more slowly to the competitive equilibrium than continuous double
auctions, and upon converging, may not be quite as efﬁcient if agents occa-
sionally attempt manipulation, are disciplined, and return to the full ex-
change volume.
A second example is the uniform price double auction (UPDA), a real-
time continuous feedback mechanism clearing all trades at a single price in
each trading period. This is a ‘designer market’ invented by experimentalists
who asked, ‘Can we combine the continuous information feedback advan-
tages of the double auction with the uniform price (zero within-period volatil-
ity) advantages of the sealed bid-offer auction?’ As we have seen above, with
blind bidding several repeat interactions are required to reach optimality,
with many lost trades in the process. Can we accelerate the price discovery
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process by continuously feeding back information on the tentative state of the
market, and allowing bids (asks) to be adjusted within each period?
This institution is made possible by high-speed computer and communica-
tion technology. It comes in several ﬂavors, or variations on the rules. In all
versions at each time, t ≤ T = time market is ‘called’ (closed), the tentative
clearing price, pt , is displayed and each agent knows the acceptance state of
all her bids (asks). This allows bids and asks to be adjusted in real time. See
the chapter by McCabe, Rassenti and Smith in Friedman and Rust (1991, pp.
311–316) for a report of 49 UPDA experiments comparing these different
versions with the continuous double auction. UPDA exhibits even more un-
der-revelation of demand and supply than the blind twosided auction dis-
cussed above, but efﬁciency tends to be much higher, especially in the ﬁrst
periods, and, in one form, (endogenous close, open book, the ‘other side’
rule with conditional time priority) exceeds that of the continuous double
auction.
Experiments using UPDA in a randomly ﬂuctuating supply and demand
environment routinely exhibit efﬁciencies of 95–100%, sometimes with as lit-
tle as 5–10% of the available surplus revealed. This is shown in Table 1 for
summary data from UPDA experiment up 43. Most agents enter bids (asks)
equal to or near the clearing price as it is continuously displayed in real time.
It is of course true, hypothetically, that if all agents reveal their true demand
or supply with the exception of one intra-marginal buyer or seller, then that
agent can manipulate the price to his or her advantage. But this parable is ir-
relevant. The relevant question is what behavior is manifest when every agent
has the potential for manipulating the price. Without knowledge or under-
standing of the whole, and without design or intention, the participants use
the rules at their disposal to achieve three properties observed by the experi-
menter: (1) high efﬁciency, (2) maximum individual proﬁt given the behav-
ior of all other agents, and (3) protection from manipulation by their pro-
tagonists.32 This ecological result illustrates the perceptive insight of Hayek
(1988, p. 19–20). “Rules alone can unite an extended order . . . Neither all
ends pursued, nor all means used, are known or need be known to anybody,
in order for them to be taken account of within a spontaneous order. Such an
order forms of itself . . . ” 
32 Space prevents me from dealing fully with the many important issues raised when a subset of
agents have asymmetric advance information on product quality or value characteristics. The
analysis shows that such conditions generate market failure or inefﬁciency. Some of these prob-
lems, however, arise because the analysis is inadequate in examining both sides of the market,
and the implications of the information content of prices. Experiments have established that
constructivist inefﬁciency is often alleviated by one of several ecologically rational response
mechanisms: competition among sellers for reputations, quality (brand) signaling, product war-
ranties, and the aggregation of private asymmetric information into public price patterns that
self correct the alleged problems. See e.g. Miller and Plott (1985); Plott and Wilde (1982); Plott
and Sunder (1982, 1988); Camerer and Weigelt (1988).522
Table 1.
Summary of Results; up 43;5,5523
Gresham’s Law: if it isn’t Cournot-Nash, why is it a law?
In this section I have given many examples of institutions in which the CE
theory of markets predicts their observed behavior. Do we have contrary ex-
amples? Yes. Gresham’s Law: bad money drives out good. This ‘law’, while
sometimes claimed to be an observed phenomena in countries all over the
world, is not a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.33 If currencies A and B are both
available, A having an intrinsic worth while B is worthless ﬁat money, then the
theory predicts that A will drive out B. This is because each agent believes
other agents are rational, and will accept only A in exchange. Each agent will
therefore avoid getting stuck with the inferior B by accepting only A, which
becomes the dominant circulating medium of exchange, while B is ‘horded.’
Experiments have conﬁrmed that if both types of money are initially avail-
able, subjects use only the superior currency (an interest bearing consol) as a
medium of exchange. But in treatments in which subjects ﬁrst experience a
history of using ﬁat money, it being the only medium of exchange available,
and then the consol is introduced, subjects continue trading with the ﬁat
money, hording the interest bearing consol. (Camera, Noussair and Tucker,
2001). This is entirely rational if each agent believes others will accept the ﬁ-
at money in exchange and this belief is supported by experience. Think of
Gresham’s Law as a belief equilibrium in which theory alone is unable to pre-
dict when it might occur. (Ledyard, 1986).
Complementing these results, another experimental study shows that when
ﬁat money is the only currency. It will be used even under the condition that
it is abandoned and replaced with a new ﬁat money issue at the end of a ﬁnite
horizon. In this study the real economy is found to suffer some loss in efﬁ-
ciency relative to the use of ‘backed’ (commodity) money, but the economy
does not collapse even in short horizon treatments. Collapse in real sector ef-
ﬁciency is observed only when a ‘government’ sector prints ﬁat money to pur-
chase real goods from the private sector. Moreover, additional experimental
tests show that the collapse cannot be due to the resulting inﬂation, but to in-
terference with the real price discovery of markets when some agents are able
to crowd out private real purchases with printing press money.34 (Deck,
McCabe and Porter, 2001).
Psychology and Markets 
Psychologists and ‘behavioral economists’ who study decision behavior almost
uniformly report results contrary to rational theory. (Hogarth and Reder,
33 Hayek (1967, p 318) notes that Gresham’s Law is not due to Gresham nor is it a ‘law’ in the the-
oretical sense, and “…as a mere empirical rule is practically worthless.” In the 1920s when people
started using dollars and other hard currencies in substitution for the depreciating mark, the
claim emerged that Gresham’s Law was wrong–that it was the other way around.
34 This is demonstrated by comparison experiments in which there are no government agents,
but ﬁat money is inﬂated each period by the average rate that is observed in those experiments
with government agents present.524
1987). It was not always so,35 but the focus on ‘anomalies’, beginning in the
1970s converted the emerging discovery enterprise into a search for contra-
dictions between reports of behavior and the caricatures36 of mainstream the-
ory that constitute much of its core. Psychologists, to their credit, have main-
tained an intensive program examining the behavioral nature of these
contradictions to the classical model. For example Siegel (1959) and
Fouraker and Siegel (1963) reported both conﬁrmations and contradictions,
and used the pattern to propose improved models. Similarly, in prospect the-
ory Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have proposed modiﬁcations in both the
utility and probability weighting functions of standard expected utility theo-
ry.37 Research strategies that focus on the study of errors, however, can distort
professional beliefs, to say nothing of popular representations, if the primary
emphasis is on the failures, to the exclusion of the predictive successes, of the
theory. 38
Psychology, Economics and the Two Kinds of Rationality 
Curiously, the image of economists and psychologists as protagonists obscures
their underlying agreement on foundations. Both rely upon constructivism:
35 “Prior to 1970 or so, most researchers in judgement and decision-making believed that people
are pretty good decision–makers… Since then, however, opinion has taken a decided turn for
the worse, though the decline was not in any sense demanded by experimental results. Subjects
did not suddenly become any less adept at experimental tasks nor did experimentalists begin to
grade their performance against a tougher standard. Instead, researchers began selectively to
emphasize some results at the expense of others.” “The view that people are irrational is real in
the sense that people hold it to be true. But the reality is mostly in the rhetoric.” (Lopes, 1991, p
66, 80).
36 I say ‘caricatures’ because economics has long offered much in the way of theoretical excep-
tions to the core neoclassical model of self-interested market competition: externalities in choice,
public good effects, and ‘anomalies’ in choice under uncertainty requiring explanation.
(Markowitz, 1952; Friedman and Savage, 1948). But it is the neoclassical assumption of self-in-
terested agents that has been the most productive of theoretical results and therefore is a promi-
nent and easy target of criticism.
37 Their most important contributions in prospect theory were in empirical tests demonstrating
the relevance of two ideas suggested originally by Markowitz (1952): the idea that the theory ap-
plies to changes in wealth (income) relative to the individual’s current asset state, and that peo-
ple are risk preferring in losses and risk averse in gains. This much is consistent with standard ex-
pected utility theory, which requires only that the prizes of choice can be ordered, and therefore
applies either to wealth or income. Which prizes the theory is best applied to, has always seemed
to me to be inherently a subject for empirical determination. If applied to wealth, the theory
starts to infringe on preference theory over time, long recognized as especially difﬁcult modeling
terrain.
38 As I see it experimental market economics and behavioral economics are in principle comple-
mentary. Experimental economists study market performance (rationality) given individual val-
uations, while cognitive psychologists study the valuations (rationality) of individuals. If the ob-
jects traded are prospects the appropriate valuations are their “cash values,” whether based on
expected utility, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or some other representation.
Thus Plott and Uhl (1981) study experimental markets in which the items traded are gambles,
and report convergence to a CE deﬁned by demand and supply based on the expected values of
the gambles. But the connective interface between rationality at the individual and at the market
level and how institutions modulate the interface has not been well explored. Markets do their
thing with whatever are the values–rational, irrational, or nonrational–that are provided by indi-
viduals.525
(1) to the extent that markets are rational39 or irrational,40 this derives di-
rectly and only from the rationality or irrationality of agents41; (2) individual
rationality is a self-aware, calculating process of maximization42; (3) predom-
inantly both are reluctant to allow that naïve, unsophisticated agents can
achieve socially optimal ends without comprehension of the whole, as well as
their individual parts, implemented by deliberate action (there is no ‘magic,’
and no room for the GS zero intelligence traders); (4) consequently, psy-
chologists test the rationality of individual decisions largely by asking for sub-
ject responses to choice problems to discover how they ‘reason.’ Rather than
challenge this constructivist view, economists, subject to the identical vision
(how do agents consciously think?), are critical of the question-response sur-
vey methods used in cognitive psychology: the stakes are zero or too low,43
and the subjects are too unsophisticated, inexperienced or untrained to allow
a serious researcher to ﬁnd out how ‘real agents, really think.’ Many psycho-
logists appear to ﬁnd irrationality everywhere, and many economists appear
to see the ﬁndings as everywhere irrelevant. To these economists, how agents
think indeed exhausts the core of empirical economics; psychologists merely
‘fail’ to properly implement their investigation of this core. 44
In point of fact opinion surveys can provide important insights: sometimes
survey ﬁndings can be tested more rigorously with reward motivated choices
in the laboratory or the ﬁeld and are found to have predictive content (e.g.,
the asymmetry between losses and gains in wealth). Sometimes what people
actually do completely contradicts what they say, and sometimes you cannot
ﬁnd out by asking because the agents themselves do not know what they will
do or are doing. For example: 
• Comparisons of risk preferences under low and high monetary stakes have
shown that actual reward levels have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on decision,
but that the qualitative conclusions from hypothetical choice response surveys
39 For example the double auction markets discussed above.
40 Experimental asset markets bubble and crash on the long path of experience to equilibrium.
(Smith, et al., 1988; Porter and Smith, 1994). For a new study of subject experience and asset bub-
bles see Dufwenberg, et al. (2002).
41 Thus, even a “…monopolist…has to have a full general equilibrium model of the economy.”
(Arrow, 1987, p 207). Also see note 30 above on racetrack market efﬁciency, and the inference
that the bettors must therefore have considerable expertise. Thus, market rationality is automat-
ically assumed to derive entirely from individual rationality.
42 Here is a particularly clear statement of decision as rational constructivist action: “Incentives do
not operate by magic: they work by focusing attention and by prolonged deliberation.” (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1987, p 90).
43 The use of cash or other reward medium in decision behavior experiments is listed by Hertwig
and Ortmann, (2001) as one of the key differences between psychology and economics experi-
ments. The controversy over paying subjects, however, is rapidly being eroded as cognitive psych-
ologists and experimental economists join with neurobiologists–including those who are in-
formed on animal behavior models – and subjects are paid salient rewards.
(Breiter et al., 2001; McCabe, et al., 2001; Thut et al., 1997).
44 Kahneman clearly does not see people as irrational except in the narrow context used in eco-
nomic modeling based on dominant choice. In fact he describes his empirical ﬁndings contra-
dicting the SSSM as having been easy, thanks to the implausibility to any psychologist of the
SSSM. See the Nobel Foundation interview of the 2002 Nobel Laureates in economics at
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-interview.html.526
are not refuted by studies using very high stakes–the accumulated payoffs aver-
age three times subjects’ normal monthly living expenses. (Kachelmeier and
Shehata, 1992; also see Binswanger, 1980 for similar ﬁndings).
• Consider the double auction in classroom demonstration experiments: in
debrieﬁngs afterwards students deny that there is any kind of quantitative
model that could predict their market price and exchange volume, or that
they were able to maximize their proﬁts; but a participant with an envelope
containing the predictions provided in advance, opens it showing that this
consensus is false. The dispersed private value/cost information is aggre-
gated into prices that are at the equilibrium and each agent is maximizing
his or her proﬁt given the behavior of all others. Here there is indeed a kind
of ‘magic’, but only, I think, in not being well understood or modeled at the
game theoretic level of individual choice.45 Our bounded rationality as eco-
nomic theorists is far more constraining on economic science, than the
bounded rationality of privately informed agents is constraining on their
ability to maximize the gains from exchange.
• In asset trading, participant survey responses reﬂect the disconnect between
their information on fundamental value and their puzzling experience of a
price bubble and crash generated on the long path to the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. (Schwartz and Ang, 1989) 
• Opinion polls administered to the IEM traders show the same judgment 
biases that psychologists and political scientists ﬁnd in public opinion polls,
but these biases did not interfere with the market’s ability to predict the
popular vote outcomes. (Forsythe et al., 1992).
• In preference reversal survey experiments subjects report many inconsistent
choices: gamble A is preferred to B but a subject will sell A for less than B.
Arbitraging the subjects’ cash motivated choices quickly reduces these incon-
sistencies (Chu and Chu, 1990, p 906), and it has been shown that the incon-
sistencies are unbiased random errors under some, but not all, conditions
(Cox and Grether, 1996; also see Soper and Gigliotti, 1993, where choice in-
transitivity is studied directly and the errors are found to be random).
• Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986; hereafter KKT) provide many ex-
amples in which respondents are asked to rate the fairness,46 on a four-point
scale, of elementary business actions in competitive environments. In one
45 At the macro-market level, convergence, and cases of stable and unstable equilibrium, are well
predicted by the classical Walrasian adjustment model, but the paths taken, including jumps
across alternative unstable equilibria, are not well predicted by the model. See the outstanding
summary by Plott (2001). The disconnect with choice behavior is evident in the following:
Walrasian dynamics makes ad hoc assumptions about price adjustments in response to excess de-
mand saying nothing about the corresponding payoff motivation of the agents who drive the
price changes. Walrasian dynamics is a story about the tatonnement mechanism in which there
are no disequilibrium trades, whereas Plott’s (2001) summary is about continuous double auc-
tion trading with a great many disequilibrium trades.
46 The descriptor ‘fairness’ has so many meanings in different contexts that I believe it is best to
avoid the term entirely in experimental science except where it is explicitly modeled and the mod-
el tested in environments where subjects make decisions on the basis of the deﬁning parameters of
the model; then the descriptor ‘fair’ and its ambiguity can be avoided altogether. This is the way it
is used in the utilitarian deﬁnitions by Franciosi, et al. (1994), in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and527
case a hardware store raises the price of snow shovels from $15 to $20 after
a snowstorm. 82% of the respondents consider this action either unfair or
very unfair. Franciosi, et al. (1995) substitute the words ‘acceptable’ for ‘fair’
and ‘unacceptable’ for ‘unfair’47 and add one additional sentence to this
KKT example: “The store does this to prevent a stock out for its regular cus-
tomers since another store has raised its price to $20.” Now only 32% rate
the action unfavorably. This exercise suggests the possible sensitivity of sur-
vey results to emotive words and/or perceived ‘justiﬁcation’ in terms of im-
personal market forces.
Note that it is in private information environments, where the market is ag-
gregating information far beyond the reach of what each individual knows,
and is able to comprehend, that the solicited opinions are so far off the mark.
The surveys yield no useful understanding because the subjects have none to
relate. In the complete information asset market, subjects are aware of its fun-
damental value structure, and come to have common expectations through
an experiential process of repetition; i.e. initial common information is not
sufﬁcient to induce common expectations.48 They play myopically and their
expressed bafﬂement (‘prices rise without cause’) reﬂects this myopia. These
comments suggest that much insight might be obtained from the systematic
study of the conditions under which survey results are robustly informative
and the conditions where they are not.
Fairness: an Experimental Market Test 
In developing a descriptive theory49 of the ‘reference transaction’, KKT state
that what is considered ‘fair’ may change: “Terms of exchange that are ini-
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Of course it is appropriate to use the descriptor if the purpose is to
see how its instructional use might have an emotive affect on behavior. The emotive content of ‘fair-
ness’ is clear in the important work of Zajac (1995), who has also examined the rhetoric of fairness
arguments as self-interest serving in the Florida, 2000, election controversy. (Zajac, 2002).
47 KKT state that “…the phrase ‘it is fair,’ is simply an abbreviation for a substantial majority of the
population studied thinks it is fair.” (KKT, 1986, p 201). But their main interest is in whether ﬁrm
behavior is affected by community norms. Whether or not an action is ‘acceptable’ would seem
to be just as important in determining ﬁrm behavior as whether or not it is ‘fair.’ If the two terms
map into different attitudes, then there is inherent ambiguity in specifying the effect on ﬁrm be-
havior.
48 This interpretation is consistent with asset trading experiments using undergraduates, small
businesspersons, corporation managers and over-the-counter traders. (Suchanek et al., 1988,
Porter and Smith….). Exceptions using inexperienced subjects, to my knowledge, have only
been observed with advanced graduate students. (McCabe and Smith, 2000–PNAS).
49 This methodology is driven by the untenable belief that general theories can be derived di-
rectly from observations if you just have enough data (see Smith, 2002, and the references there-
in). “Perhaps the most important lesson learned from these studies is that the rules of fairness
cannot be inferred either from conventional economic principles or from intuition and intro-
spection. In the words of Sherlock Holmes in ‘ The Adventure of the Copper Beaches’: ‘Data!
Data! Data! I cannot make bricks without clay.’ ” KKT (1986, p115–116). Neither can a predictive
theory of ‘fairness’ be inferred from any amount of the KKT data. If N ‘fairness’ rules are dis-
covered by trial and error modiﬁcations in the survey questionnaires, you cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that there is an N + 1st variation that will identify a new one. More data will not help, as
the fairness concept is used here as a word that provides no effective means of modifying stan-
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tially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of a reference transaction.”
(KKT, 1991, p 203). This paves the way for the adaptation of ‘fairness beliefs’
to changes in the competitive equilibrium. Although the competitive model
is the one that has static predictive content, its prediction is silent as to how
long it will take to respond to a change in parameters. KKTs arguments are
not predictive, but they tell a story about why markets might be sluggish in re-
sponding to change. How good is their story?
Franciosi, et al. (1995), state a preference model of optimal choice that al-
lows for a utilitarian trade-off between own-consumption and ‘fairness’. For
example, the utility of two commodities (x,z) is given by: u(x, z) = z + ax –
(b/2) x2 –  x[( / 0) – 1], in which the seller’s proﬁt,  , relative to a refer-
ence proﬁt,  0, appears as an ‘externality’ in the buyer’s utility function. The
usual maximization subject to an income constraint yields the inverse de-
mand equation: p = a – bx –  [( / 0) – 1]. Thus, for   > 0 any change in the
environment that increases a ﬁrm’s proﬁt relative to the reference proﬁt has
an external effect that lowers the buyer’s inverse demand for units x. If   = 0,
then we have the standard own-maximizing theory. Consequently, Franciosi,
et al. (1995) can test the hypothesis, never using the word ‘fairness,’ that if
subject buyers have a utilitarian concern for proﬁts not being increased rela-
tive to a baseline then after a change from the baseline this should alter the
observed equilibrium relative to the standard predicted equilibrium with no
external effect,   = 0. In a posted offer market giving KKT their best shot
(sellers cannot see each other’s posted prices, and therefore cannot know-
ingly emulate or undercut each other’s prices). Franciosi, et al. (1995) ﬁnd
that when   = 0 (implemented by either no disclosure, or by marginal cost
justifying disclosure) the market converges quickly to the new competitive
equilibrium. When   > 0 (implemented by proﬁt   and  0 disclosure) prices
converge more slowly, but precisely, to the new equilibrium. Hence, under
conditions most favorable to a ‘fairness’ effect, the response dynamics is
changed, but not the equilibrium as predicted by the standard competitive
model. The discipline of the market swamps all but a transient ‘fairness’ ef-
fect. If sellers can see each others prices, I would predict a much smaller ‘fair-
ness’ effect, if any.
III. PERSONAL SOCIAL EXCHANGE 
One of the most intriguing discoveries of experimental economics is that (1)
as we have seen, people invariably behave non-cooperatively in small and
large group ‘impersonal’ market exchange institutions; (2) many (up to half
in single play; over 90% in repeat play) cooperate in ‘personal’ exchange
(two-person extensive form games); (3) yet in both economic environments
all interactions are between anonymous players. In this section I shall attempt
to summarize some of the most compelling evidence of cooperation in per-
sonal exchange–in the ﬁeld as well as the laboratory–and review some of the
test results designed to discriminate among the more prominent predictive529
hypotheses for modeling cooperative behavior. Whatever might be the most
useful way to model and explain cooperation, unaided by market incentives,
my working hypothesis throughout is that it is a product of an unknown mix
of cultural and biological evolution, with the biology providing abstract func-
tion deﬁning potential, and culture shaping the emergent forms that we ob-
serve. But to motivate the whole exercise in thought, I will begin with a dis-
cussion of some persistent cross-cultural social practices from business, law,
anthropology and American economic history.
How might a social rule (practice, norm) emerge, become a cultural ﬁx-
ture, and be widely emulated? I will use a parable to illustrate how a rule for
‘bargaining in good faith’ might become established.
In bargaining over the exchange price between a buyer and seller, suppose
the seller begins by announcing a selling price, the buyer responds with a low-
er buying price, the seller reduces his asking price, and so on. In this conces-
sionary process it is considered bad form for the buyer (or seller), once hav-
ing made a concession, to return to a lower (or higher) price. This violates a
principle of ‘bargain in good faith.’ (See Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). How
might this come about? One can suppose that those who fail to bargain in
good faith would be less likely to be sought out by others for repeat transac-
tions. Such behavior raises transactions cost by increasing the time it takes to
complete a sale. Trading pairs would be expected to self-select, tending to iso-
late the more time consuming bargainers, and it would take them longer to
ﬁnd those willing to tolerate the time cost of bargaining. Such practices–in-
herently economizing in this parable–might then become part of a cultural
norm, powerful enough to be codiﬁed ultimately in contract law and in stock
exchange rules. Proposition: in this manner collectives discover law in those
rules that persist long enough to become entrenched practices. In this exam-
ple the emergent rule reduces transaction cost, leaving open the classical
question of how equilibrium can be characterized in bilateral bargaining.
Spontaneous Order without the Law50
The early ‘law-givers’ did not make the law they ‘gave’; they studied social tra-
ditions and informal rules and gave voice to them, as God’s, or natural, law.51
50 Experimental studies have inquired as to whether emergent norms of cooperation and con-
structivist incentive schemes are substitutes, the latter crowding out the former. See Bohnet, et al.
(2001) and Fehr and Gachter (2000) for studies suggesting that they are substitutes (formal rules
undermine informal cooperative norms), and Lazzarini, et al. (2002) for new results suggesting
that they are complements–contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of relational elements be-
yond contractibility. I would hypothesize that both must be true: constructivist rules ultimately
must pass ﬁtness tests of ecological rationality. Formal rules that are incompatible with informal
rules will be modiﬁed or eliminated; those that are compatible will persist. Hence, at any time-
slice in history, both must necessarily be observed across all socioeconomic experiments.
51 “…all early (my insertion: as in Sumar with the beginning of writing) ‘law-giving’ consisted in ef-
forts to record and make known a law that was conceived as unalterably given. A ‘legislator’ might
endeavor to purge the law of supposed corruptions, or to restore it to its pristine purity, but it was
not thought that he could make new law… But if nobody had the power or intention to change
the law…this does not mean that law did not continue to develop.” (Hayek, 1973, p 81).530
The common lawyer, Sir Edward Coke, championed 17th century social
norms as law commanding higher authority than the king. Remarkably, these
forces prevailed, paving the way for the rule of law in England.52 Similarly, the
cattlemen’s associations, land clubs, and mining districts in the American
West all fashioned their own rules for establishing property rights and en-
forcing them: the brand on the hindquarters of his calf was the cattlemen’s
indelible ownership signature on his property, enforced by gunmen hired
through his cattle club;53 squatter’s rights were defended ably (possession is
nine points of the law?) by the land clubs composed of those brave enough to
settle wilderness lands in advance of veterans exercising their land script
claims, and of settlers under the Homestead Act; mining claims were deﬁned,
established and defended by the guns of the mining clubbers, whose rules
were later to become part of public mining law. (Anderson and Hill, 1975;
Umbeck, 1977). For over a century, the Maine lobstermen have established
rights, used threats, then force, to defend exclusive individual lobster ﬁshing
territories in the ocean. (Acheson, 1975). Eskimo polar bear hunting teams
awarded the upper half of the bear’s skin (prized for its long mane hairs used
to line women’s boots) to that person who ﬁrst ﬁxed his spear in the prey.
(Freuchen, 1961). Extant hunter-gatherers have evolved sharing customs for
the products of communal hunting and gathering. For example the Ache of
Eastern Paraguay share the volatile products of the hunt widely within the
tribe, while the low variance products of gathering are shared only within the
nuclear family. (Hawkes, 1990; Kaplan and Hill, 1985).
Ellickson Out-Coases Coase 
Using the rancher/farmer parable, Coase (1960) argued that if there were no
costs of transacting, then theoretically efﬁciency could not depend on who
was liable for damages to crops caused by stray animals. Legal liability gives
the rancher an incentive to employ cost-efﬁcient measures to control straying
cattle. But if she were not liable, then in a world of zero transactions cost, vic-
tims would be led in their own interest to negotiate a settlement paying the
rancher to undertake the same efﬁcient control measures induced by legal li-
ability. In so doing, trespass victims save the cost of crop damage, assumed to
52 What allowed the rule of ‘natural’ or found law to prevail in England “…was the deeply en-
trenched tradition of a common law that was not conceived as the product of anyone’s will but
rather as a barrier to all power, including that of the king–a tradition which Edward Coke was to
defend against King James I and Francis Bacon, and which Matthew Hale at the end of the seven-
teenth century masterly restated in opposition to Thomas Hobbes.” (Hayek, 1973, p 85; also see
pp 167, 173–4).
53 These voluntary private associations for sharing the cost of a common good–policing–were sub-
sequently undermined by statehood, and the publicly ﬁnanced local sheriff as the recognized
monopoly law enforcement ofﬁcer. This observation contradicts the myth that a central function
of government is to ‘solve’ the free rider problem in the private provision of public goods. Here
we have the reverse: the incentive of the cattlemen’s clubs was to free ride on the general tax-
payer, assigning the sheriff the task of enforcing property rights in cattle. The same free riding
occurs with school busing programs, and in publicly provided education itself in which govern-
ment ﬁnancing need not require government provision.531
be more than the cost of cattle control–otherwise it is inefﬁcient to control
them. The externality is internalized by market negotiation incentives.
Curiously, the Coase Theorem–that in the absence of transactions cost efﬁ-
ciency does not depend upon the locus of liability–was controversial. It was
clearly intended as a kindly spoof of oversimpliﬁed theories that, in particu-
lar, ignored transactions cost.54 The real problem, addressed brilliantly by
Coase, was to deal with the question of efﬁcient liability rules in a world of sig-
niﬁcant transactions cost. He then proceeded to use the transactions cost
framework to examine the problem of social cost in a variety of legal prece-
dents and cases.55
In the beginning Shasta County California was governed by ‘open range’
law, meaning that in principle ranchers are not legally liable for damages re-
sulting from their cattle accidentally trespassing on unfenced land. Then, in
1945 a California law authorized the Shasta County Board of Supervisors to
substitute a ‘closed range’ ordinance in sub regions of the County. Dozens of
conversions have occurred since this enabling law. Under a closed range law
the rancher is strictly liable–even if not negligent–for damage caused by his
livestock. Elickson (1991), out- Coased Coase by, in effect, asking, ‘given that
this county applies the polar legal rules used in Coase’s illustration, how do
neighbors in Shasta County actually handle the problem of stray cattle?’ The
answer: “Neighbors in fact are strongly inclined to cooperate, but they
achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally established en-
titlements,56 as the parable supposes, but rather developing and enforcing
adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal arrangements.
Although the route chosen is not the one that the parable anticipates, the
end reached is exactly the one that Coase predicted: coordination to mutual
advantage without supervision by the state.”57 (Ellikson, 1991. p 4). Thus,
Shasta County citizens, including judges, attorneys and insurance adjustors,
do not have full working knowledge of formal local trespass law.58 Citizens no-
tify owners and help catch the trespassing animal; use mental accounting
(reciprocity) to settle debts, e.g. a rancher, whose cattle have strayed may tell
the victim to come down and take some hay, or if your goat eats my tomato
54 Later game theoretic formulations have allowed that with two or more alternatives there may
exist ‘standoff equilibria’ that stall agreement in Coase bargaining. (See Myerson, 1991, p 506).
These cases may limit extensions of the Coase Theorem, but do not I think detract from its es-
sential message that the locus of liability was irrelevant.
55 Coase (1974) also noticed that the light house was frequently cited by theorists as an example
of a ‘pure’ public good. As was his style (to confront the casual parables of theory that ﬁnessed
certain costs by ﬁat), his response in effect was, ‘well, lets see what people have done who actual-
ly operate lighthouses, or who use the services of lighthouses.’ It turned out that early light-
houses were private enterprise, not government, solutions to a public good problem, and the al-
leged inevitability of free riding was solved by the owner who contracted with port authorities to
collect lighthouse fees when ships arrived portside to load or unload cargo.
56 These are the outside options or threat points in game theory.
57 The same results emerge in laboratory experiments reported by Hoffman and Spitzer (1985)
58 Under open range the animal owner is liable for intentional trespass, trespass of a lawful fence,
and trespass by goats, whatever the circumstances, suggesting the hypothesis that goat behavior
had long been recognized in pastoral norms and now captured in codiﬁed law.532
plants, you offer to help me replant them; use negative gossip, complain to
ofﬁcials, submit informal claims for money (but not though a lawyer) to pun-
ish deviant neighbors; rarely use lawyers to seek monetary compensation;
share the building of fences, most often by a rule of proportionality–you pay
more if you have more animals than your neighbor; ignore fence law as irre-
levant; and do not change fence obligations with the planting of crops.
Finally, contrary to the Coasian parable the main cost of trespass is not from
crop damage, but from highway collisions that kill animals and damage prop-
erty.
Extensive Form Interactions between Anonymously Paired Individuals
Cooperation has also emerged in anonymous two person extensive form
games in laboratory experiments. Although such behavior is contrary to ra-
tional prescriptions, it is not inconsistent with our examples of spontaneous
order without externally imposed law.
Why do we study anonymous interactions in the laboratory? The model of
non-repeated game theory is about strangers without a history or a future
(Rosenthal, 1982), but anonymity has long been used in small group experi-
ments to control for the unknown complexities of natural social intercourse.
(Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). It is well documented that face-to-face interac-
tion swamps subtler procedural effects in yielding cooperative outcomes.
(Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Roth, in Kagel and Roth, 1995). But more im-
portant, I believe it is this condition that provides the greatest scope for ex-
ploring the human instinct for social exchange, and how it is affected by con-
text, reward and procedural conditions that vary elements of social distance.
Again, studying what is not helps us to understand what is.
Perception and the Internal Order of the Mind: why context matters
Two decision tasks, represented by the same abstract game tree may lead to
different responses because they occur in different contexts. Why? The an-
swer may be found in the process by which we perceive the external world.
Hayek (1952)59 was a pioneer in developing a theory of perception, which an-
ticipated recent contributions to the neuroscience of perception. It is natur-
al for our minds to suppose that experience is formed from the receipt of sen-
sory impulses that reﬂect unchanging attributes of external objects in the
environment. Instead, Hayek proposed that our current perception results
from a relationship between external impulses and our past experience of
similar conditions. Categories formed in the mind are based on the relative
frequency with which current and past perceptions coincide. Memory con-
sists of external stimuli that have been modiﬁed by processing systems whose
59 The Sensory Order was not published until 1952 when Hayek revised a manuscript, originally
written in the 1920’s, entitled “What is Mind?” 
60 The interdependence between perception and memory is revealed by the different descrip-
tions of the same event by two eyewitnesses. (Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangun, 1998, pp 484–6).533
organization is conditioned by past experience.60 (Hayek, 1952 p. 64, 165).
There is a “constant dynamic interaction between perception and memory,
which explains the . . . identity of processing and representational networks of
the cortex that modern evidence indicates.” “Although devoid of mathemat-
ical elaboration, Hayek’s model clearly contains most of the elements of those
later network models of associative memory…” (Fuster, 1999, p. 88–9).
Hayek’s model captures the idea that, in the internal order of the mind,
perception is selforganized: abstract function combines with experience to
determine network connectivity and expansion.61 Loss can occur either from
lack of function or the stimulus of developmental experience. Block or dis-
tort sensory input, and function is impaired; impair function by brain lesions
or inherited deﬁciency, and development is compromised.
This model is consistent with the hypothesis that the mind is organized by
interactive modules (circuits) that are specialized for vision, for language
learning, for socialization and a host of other functions. (See Cosmides and
Tooby, 1992; Pinker, 1995). In this view, mind is the unconscious product of
co-evolution between the biological and cultural development of our brains
that distinguished us from other primates. It was what made reason possible.
Our folk predilection for believing in the ‘blank slate’ concept of mind
(Pinker, 2002) makes plain that this interpretation of mind is just as conso-
nant with our direct experience as was once the idea that the earth is ﬂat, or
that witches had to be destroyed. In each case to escape from the folk per-
ception requires the falsifying indirect evidence, based on reason, to become
part of our ‘felt’ experience. Constructivist rationality then becomes ecologi-
cally rational.
Experimental procedures 
The experiments I will report will show how social context can be important
in the interactive decision behaviour we observe. This possibility follows from
the autobiographical character of memory and the manner in which past en-
coded experience interacts with current sensory input in creating memory. I
will be reporting the results of decision-making in single play, two-person, se-
quential-move game trees. Subject instructions do not use technical and role-
suggestive words like ‘game,’ ‘play,’ ‘players, ‘opponent,’ and ‘partner’ (ex-
cept where variations on the instructions are used as systematic treatments to
61 Built into your brain is the maintained hypothesis that the world around you is stationary. Look
at the wall and move your eyes back and forth with head still. The wall does not move. Now press
your eyeball with your ﬁnger through the eyelid from the side. The wall moves as you jiggle your
eyeball. Why the difference? When you ﬂex the eye muscles and move your eyes back and forth,
a copy of the signal goes to the occipital cortex to offset apparent movement of the wall so that
the net perception is that of a stationary wall. This stabilizing self ordered system for seeing also
makes you vulnerable to optical illusions of motion. Moving your eyes back and forth between
the tunnel gate and your airplane as it docks, you ambiguously ‘sense’ that either the gate or the
plane, or both, is in motion. The ambiguity is resolved only when the gate, or plane, stops.
62 See Burnham, McCabe and Smith (2000), discussed below, for a study comparing the effect of
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identify their effect)62; rather reference is made to the ‘decision tree,’ ‘deci-
sion maker 1’ (DM1) or 2 (DM2), and ‘your counterpart,’ etc. The purpose is
to provide a baseline context, which avoids emotive words that might trigger
unintended meanings by the experimenter.63 I do not mean that the baseline
is “neutral,” a concept that is not clearly deﬁnable, given that context effects
can depend on autobiographical experience. The effect of instructional vari-
ation on decision is an empirical matter and any particular set of instructions
must always be considered a treatment unless the observations are shown to
be robust to changes in the instructions. All observations must be seen as a
joint product of experimental procedures and the theoretical hypotheses, im-
plemented by particular parameters that it is our intention to test. This is not
unique to laboratory observations, but a characteristic also of ﬁeld observa-
tions, and the whole of science. (See Smith, 2002 for examples from physics,
astronomy and experimental economics). It is therefore important to under-
stand how procedures as well as different parameterizations (games, payoffs)
affect behaviour.
Subjects are recruited in advance for an economics experiment. Upon ar-
rival at the appointed time they register, receive a show-up fee, and are as-
signed to a private computer terminal in a large room with 40 stations.
Commonly there are 11 other people, well spaced throughout the room, in
the experiments reported below. After everyone has arrived each person logs
into the experiment reads through the instructions for the experiment, re-
sponds to instructional questions, and learns that he or she is matched anony-
mously with another person in the room, whose identity will never be known,
and vice versa. This does not mean that a subject knows nothing about their
matched counterpart. For example, it may appear evident that he or she is
another ‘like’ person, such as an undergraduate, or an industry executive
with whom one may feel more-or-less an in-group identity. Obviously, each
person imports into the experiment a host of different past experiences and
impressions that are likely to be associated with the current experiment.
The Context of Decision: The Ultimatum Game Example 
Consider the ultimatum game, a two-stage two-person game with the follow-
ing abstract form: for each pair the experimenter makes a ﬁxed sum of mon-
ey, m, available (e.g. m will be 10 one-dollar bills, or 10 ten-dollar bills); play-
er 1 moves ﬁrst offering 0 ≤ x ≤ m units of the money to player 2, player 1
retaining m – x; player 2 then responds by either accepting the offer, in which
case player 1 is paid m – x, and player 2 is paid x, or rejecting the offer, in
which case each player receives nothing.
Below I report ultimatum results from four different instructional/proce-
63 It is not meaningful or helpful to talk about ‘experimenter effects.’ There are instructional and
procedural effects, including the presence or absence of an experimenter, what he/she knows or
does not know (as in double blind behavioral experiments), and what he/she does or does not
do. All of the elementary operations used to implement an experiment are treatments that may
or may not have a signiﬁcant effect on observed outcomes.dural treatments (contexts) that have the same underlying abstract game
structure. In each case imagine that you are player 1. See Hoffman et al.,
(1994; hereafter HMSS) for instructional details, and for references to the lit-
erature and the origins of the ultimatum game.
‘Divide $10.’ You and your counterpart have been ‘provisionally allocated
$10,’ and randomly assigned to positions. Your task as player 1 is to ‘divide’
the $10 by ﬁlling out a form that will then go to your counterpart who will ac-
cept or reject it.
‘Contest entitlement.’ The 12 people in the room each answer the same 10
questions on a general knowledge quiz. Your score is the number of questions
answered correctly; ties are broken in favor of the person who ﬁrst ﬁnished
the quiz. The scores are ranked from 1 (highest) through 12 (lowest). Those
ranked 1–6 are informed that they have earned the right to be person player
1, the other six will be players 2.
‘Exchange.’ Player 1 is a seller, and 2 is a buyer. A table lists the buyer and
seller proﬁt for each price $0, $1, $2, . . . , $10 charged by the seller, and the
buyer chooses to buy or not buy. The proﬁt of the seller is the price chosen;
the proﬁt of the buyer is ($10 – price). Each receives nothing if the buyer re-
fuses to buy.
‘Contest/Exchange.’ This treatment combines Contest with Exchange; i.e.
the sellers and buyers in Exchange are selected by the contest scoring proce-
dure. In one version the total amount is 10 one-dollar bills, and in the second
it is 10 ten-dollar bills.
Whatever the context there is a game theoretic concept of equilibrium
(sub-game perfect) that yields the same prediction in all four treatments
(Selten, 1975): player 1 offers the minimum unit of account, $1 ($10) if m =
$10 ($100), and player 2 accepts the offer. This follows from the assumption
that each player is self interested in the narrow sense of always choosing the
largest of two immediate payoffs for herself; that this condition is common
knowledge for the two players; and that player 1 applies backward induction
to the decision problem faced by player 2, conditional on player 1’s offer.
Thus player 1 reasons that any positive payoff is better than zero for player 2
and therefore, player 1 need only offer x = $1 ($10).
One difﬁculty with this analysis is that, depending on context, the interac-
tion may be interpreted as a social exchange between the two anonymously
matched players who in day-today experience read intentions into the actions
of others. (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Suppose the situation is perceived as a social
contract as follows: if player 2 has an entitlement to more than the minimum
unit of account, then an offer of less than the perceived entitlement (say, on-
ly $1, or even $2–$3) may be rejected by some players 2. Player 1, introspec-
tively anticipating this possible mental state of player 2, might then offer $4 or
$5 to insure acceptance of his offer. Alternatively, player 1 might enjoy (get
utility from) giving money to his counterpart. The point is simply that there
are alternative models to that of sub-game perfection that predict choices in
the ultimatum game, and these alternatives leave wide latitude for the possi-
bility of context affecting the behaviour of both players. Abstract game theo-
535ry can embrace these alternatives through the artiﬁce of ‘types’–utilities, or
beliefs states such as trust, trustworthy, reciprocation, etc. Ultimately the pre-
dictive success of such models depends on relating task descriptions deﬁning
context to autobiographical characteristics of individuals that are then iden-
tiﬁed by types that in turn determine behaviour. The point that needs em-
phasis is that it is easy to go from ‘types’ (traditionally utility or beliefs about
states) to game theoretic choice; the hard part is to relate ‘types’ to charac-
teristics of the individual’s memory-sensory system. Given the directions of
neuroscience and the learning from brain imaging, I do not think this is an
impossible order.
Observe that in ‘Divide $10’ the original $10 is allocated imprecisely to
both players. Moreover, a common deﬁnition of the word ‘divide’ (Webster)
includes the separation of some divisible quantity into equal parts. Finally,
random devices are recognized as a standard mechanism for ‘fair’ (equal)
treatment. Consequently, the instructions might be interpreted as suggesting
that the experimenter is engaged in the ‘fair’ treatment of the subjects cueing
them to be ‘fair’ to each other.
As an alternative, Contest deliberately introduces a pre-game procedure
that requires player 1 to ‘earn’ the right to be the ﬁrst mover. This may cue
some insipient norm of just desert based on the pre-game quiz.
In Exchange the ultimatum game is imbedded in the gains from exchange
from a transaction between a buyer and a seller. In an exchange, both the
buyer and the seller are made better off, and buyers in our culture may ac-
cept the right of a seller to move ﬁrst by quoting a price.
Contest/Exchange combines the implicit property right norm of a seller
with a mechanism for earning the property right.
Table 2 summarizes the results from two different studies of ultimatum
game bargaining with stakes of either 10 one-dollar or 10 ten-dollar bills for
each of N pairs of players, where N varies from 23 to 33 subject pairs.
1. Comparing Divide $10 with Divide $100 under the random entitlement
we observe a trivial difference in the amount offered between the low stakes
(43.7%) and the 10-fold increase in the stakes (44.4%). Also, there is no sig-
niﬁcant difference in the percentage rate at which offers are rejected, 8.3%
and 3.7% respectively.
2. When Exchange is combined with an earned entitlement the increase in
stakes lowers the offer percentage from 30.8% for $10 stakes to 27.8% for
$100 stakes, but this difference is within the normal range of sampling error
using different groups of subjects and is not signiﬁcant. Surprisingly, however,
this minuscule decline in the mean offer causes the rejection rate to go up
from 12.5% to 21.7%. Three of four subject players 1 offering $10 are reject-
ed, and one offer of $30 is rejected in the game with $100 stakes. As has been
shown in trust/punishment games, this behavior is associated with a strong
human propensity to incur personal cost to punish those who are perceived
as cheaters, even under strict anonymity.
3. We note that comparing the Divide $10/Random entitlement condition
with the Exchange entitlement, the offer percentage declines from 43.7% to
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37.1%, and comparing the former to the Earned entitlement the decline is
from 43.7% to 36.2%, both reductions being statistically signiﬁcant. Even
more signiﬁcant is the reduction form 43.7% to 30.8% when the Earned and
Exchange Entitlements are combined. Moreover, in all four of these compa-
risons the rejection rate is null or modest (0 to 12.5%).
4. The small proportion of the offers that were rejected, except when the
stakes were $100 in the Earned/Exchange context and the mean offers de-
clined to a low of 27.8%, indicates that players 1 read their counterparts well,
and as the context is altered, normally offer a sufﬁcient amount to avoid be-
ing rejected. The one exception shows clearly that pushing the edge, even if
it seems justiﬁed by the higher stakes, may invite an escalation of rejections.
These data indicate that context is important in the ultimatum game: the
percentage offered varies by over a third as we move from the highest (44%)
to the lowest (28%) measured effect. Like variation is reported in cross-cul-
tural experiments: a comparison of two hunter-gather and ﬁve modern cul-
tures reveals variation from a high of 48% (Los Angeles subjects) to a low of
26% (Machiguenga subjects from Peru). (Heinrich, 2000). These compa-
risons used care in attempted to control for instructional differences across
different languages, but this is inherently problematic, given the nature of
perception, in that one cannot be sure that the instructions, translations, pay-
offs, or the procedures for handling the subjects, control adequately for con-
Table 2. Mean Percentage Offered by Treatment in Ultimatum Games1
1 Source: Data from Hoffman, et al. (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996a). See the
references for the statistical signiﬁcance of pair wise comparisons as discussed in the text.
2 Refers to percentage of the N pairs in which the second player rejects the offer of the ﬁrst.
3 The graduate students were visiting participants in an introductory workshop in experimental
economics. These are new data not previously reported.538
text across cultures. In each culture one needs to vary the instructions/pro-
cedures and observe the sampling distribution of outcomes, then compare
the sample distributions across cultures.
These instructional treatment effects call into question the extent to which
one can deﬁne what is meant by “unbiased” instructions. If results are robust
with respect to instructional changes, this can only be established empirically.
Without such studies no claims can be made concerning the relative ‘neu-
trality’ of instructions. The main lesson is that, because of the nature of per-
ception and memory, context should matter, and in the ultimatum game the
variation of observed results with systematic instructional changes designed
to alter context shows clearly that context can and does matter.
Experimenters, subject to the same perception/memory variations, are likely
to disagree as to what is ‘neutral.’ 
Dictator Games with and without Gains from Exchange 
The ultimatum game is converted into a dictator game by removing the right
of the second mover to veto the offer of the ﬁrst. Forsythe, et al. (1994; here-
after FHSS) note that if the observed tendency toward equal split of the prize
is due primarily to ‘fairness’–a social norm of just division–then it should be of
little consequence if this right is eliminated. But if it is the prospect of rejec-
tion–however irrational–that tempers the amount offered by Player 1, then the
Table 3. Dictator Giving: With and Without Gains from Exchange and Social
History
1 Data from Forsythe, et al. (1994), replicated by Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996b).
2 Data from Hoffman, et al. (1994), Double Blind 2.
3 Data from Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). Their procedures are different, but are nearest
to those of Double Blind 2 in HMSS.
4 Since the sender amount is tripled, if the receivers return an average of 33.3 percent, then the
average amount returned will equal (pay back) the amount sent.539
outcomes should be materially affected by removing the right of rejection,
which converts the ultimatum game into what is called the dictator game.
Thus a signiﬁcant reduction in the mean percent offered in the dictator game
would be consistent with the second hypothesis, while no signiﬁcant reduction
would be consistent with the ﬁrst. Comparing the results in Table 3, column 1
with those for Divide $10, Random Entitlement in Table 2, we see that the
mean dictator offer is only 23.3% compared with the mean ultimatum offer of
43.7%. FHSS conclude that fairness alone cannot account for behavior in the
ultimatum game. This is correct, but, equally of interest, why are dictators giv-
ing away nearly a quarter of their endowment? This research puzzle was
picked up by HMSS who conjectured that such generosity might be, at least in
part, a consequence of the incompleteness of anonymity. In all the games pri-
or to the HMSS study the members of each player pair were anonymous with
respect to each other but not with respect to the experimenter who knew
every person’s decision. Hence, they introduced a “double blind” treatment
category (two versions) in which the protocol made it transparent that no one,
including the experimenter, could learn the decisions of any player. Data from
the second version, Double Blind 2, are reported in Table 3. In this treatment
mean dictator offers decline to only 10.5%. Consequently, context–in this case
social connectedness or distance–has an important affect on dictator trans-
fers.64 These issues are explored more fully in Hoffman, McCabe and Smith
(1996b) who vary social distance by varying the instructional and protocol pa-
rameters that deﬁne various versions of single and double blind dictator
games. Also reported in Table 3 is the percent given by the top 50% of the
most generous dictators: 38.3% for Single Blind and 21% for Double Blind.
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995, hereafter BDM) modify the dictator
game to introduce gains from ‘exchange.’65 Their investment trust two-stage
dictator game also uses the Double Blind 2 protocol: dictators in room A send
any portion of their $10 (0 to $10) to their random counterpart in room B.
People in both rooms know that if $x is sent by anyone, it is tripled, so that
the counterpart receives $3x. Thus, the most generous offer, $10, yields a gain
to $30. The counterpart can then respond by sending any part (0 to $3x) of
the amount received back to his or her matched sender. Now an exchange
with gains to both parties is possible, and BDM ask if this context is a signiﬁ-
cant treatment. Note that the analysis of the game is no different than the on-
estage dictator game: by the principle of backward induction Player 1 can see
that Player 2’s interest is to keep all the money received, and therefore noth-
ing should be sent. The fact that the sender’s transfer will be tripled is irrele-
vant. But it is not irrelevant if both players see the interaction as an exchange
based on trust by Player 1 and trustworthiness by Player 2.
64 These double blind procedures and treatment effects have been replicated by two other inves-
tigations (Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Burnham (1998)).
Bolton, Katok, and Zwick (1998), using a different double blind procedure failed to replicate the
results, suggesting that procedures matter and interact with the double blind condition.
65 For a recent extension and replication of the BDM ﬁndings see Pillutla, et al. (2002). Also see
Ortmann, et al. (2002).540
In Table 3 sender Players 1 now give 51.6%, when the transfer is tripled,
compared with 23.3%, when it is not. Furthermore, the top 50% of the givers
send 74.4% of the money, up from 38.3%. This shows how the tripled pie
shifts the distribution toward larger transfers by Players 1. But on average the
senders do not quite break even: an average of 27.2% of the amount received
by Players 2 is returned to Players 1 (break even would be 33.3% since x is
tripled). In the social history treatment the instructions and protocol are the
same as described above except that the second treatment group is shown the
distribution of amounts transferred and returned for the ﬁrst group.
Comparing the social history with the baseline mean percent given and re-
turned reveals the effect of being exposed to the decision data of the ﬁrst
group. Social history does not cause a reduction in transfers, which actually
increases marginally from 51.6% to 53.6%. The average percent returned in-
creases from 27.2% to 35.5%, just above the breakeven level.
These results are not explicable by the canons of traditional game theory
that assumes self-interested (in the sense of always choosing larger payoffs)
types. By introducing gains from the investment by Player 1, who can only
beneﬁt if Player 2 perceives the process as an exchange calling for payment
for services rendered, dictator giving more than doubles. And the effect of so-
cial history does not precipitate a decline in investment nor in the return to
Players 2– in fact both increase slightly. The same behaviors have been ob-
served in chimpanzee and capuchin monkey communities. (deWaal, 1989
and 1997). Should such trusting and trustworthy behaviors be diminished in
human communities characterized by the maxim that “the rules of morality
are not…conclusions of (our) reason?” 
Trust Games 
Ultimatum and dictator games have been studied extensively, but are much
too simple to allow an adequate understanding of some of the underlying be-
havior manifest in them. It is tempting to over interpret them in terms of a
mixed utility for own and other reward. The potential for greatly expanding
what can be learned is illustrated in Table 3 where BDM extended the dicta-
tor game to a two-stage game with gains from voluntary exchange. We turn
therefore to a somewhat richer class of two-person extensive form trust games
in which equilibrium play, cooperation, and the prospect of defection can be
studied in a richer parameter space than the ultimatum game.66
Figure 1 is a typical “trust” game tree.67 Play starts at the top of the tree,
node x1, with Player 1 who can move right, which stops the game yielding the
66 Space does not permit examining also the effect of being able to punish defection. See
McCabe, Rassenti and Smith (1996) for a more complete report of trust games with and without
punishment of defection and with a wide variety of matching protocols.
67 As indicated above, the word “trust” never appears in the instructions. Of interest, however, is
that the subjects use this word when you ask them openended questions about their analysis and
perceptions of the game. “Its all a question of whether you can trust your partner.” Neither do we
use the word “partner.” 541
upper payoff to player 1, $10, and the lower payoff to player 2, $10, or move
down in which case Player 2 chooses a move at node x2. If Player 2’s move is
right, Player 1 receives $15, and Player 2, $25. This is the cooperative (C) out-
come. If, however, player 2 moves down the payoffs to 1 and 2 are respective-
ly $0 and $40. This is the defection (D) outcome, in which Player 2 defects on
Player 1’s offer to cooperate. The sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) is $10
for each player. This follows because at node 1 Player 1 can apply backward
induction by observing that if play reaches node x2, Player 2’s dominant
choice is to defect. Seeing that this is the case, Player 1’s dominant choice is
to move right at the top of the tree, yielding the SPE outcome.
These game theoretic assumptions are very strong. As we see from the
above discussion, however, they have the dubious merit of allowing ‘unam-
biguous’ predictions to be made about behavior.68 We particularly want to
note that if every player is exactly like every other player, and is strictly self-in-
terested, there is no room for “mind reading,” or inferring intentions from
actions, and no room for more sophisticated and subtle action in the self-in-
terest.
To illustrate, suppose that you have been through the standard economics
course in game theory and that you are in the position of Player 2 in Figure 1.
Consequently, you expect Player 1 to move right at the top of the tree. He
doesn’t. He moves down, and it is your turn. Surely he did not move down be-
cause he prefers $0 to $10, or expects you to defect. He must think that you
think that he wants you to choose C. Whatever else can he have in mind?
Maybe he cannot do backward induction, or thinks you are not self-interest-
ed. So how are you going to respond? He is making it possible for you to in-
crease your payoff by 150%, and his by 50%, compared with the SPE. He is
not even asking for the larger share of the pie that his action has created!
According to reciprocity theory, if you choose C, you will reciprocate his in-
ferred intentions, and complete an exchange–exactly in the same way that
you trade favors, services and goods across time with your closer friends and
associates in life (except for those who are victims of antisocial personality dis-
order, or sociopaths, and are unable to maintain social relations based on
reciprocity)69; also in the same way that you do not hesitate to leave a ‘tip’ (“to
68 Except see Smith, 2002, wherein it is shown that if, in addition to the research hypothesis de-
rived from game theory (e.g., Cournot-Nash or SPE), there is one auxiliary hypothesis (e.g., pay-
offs are adequate, types have been accurately deﬁned, or subjects are sophisticated), then either
the theoretical hypothesis is not falsiﬁable, or it has no predictive content. The belief, however,
persists that the predictions of game theory are sharp and unambiguous. (See, e.g. Camerer, et
al., 2001).
69 “Sociopaths, who comprise only 3–4% of the male population and less than 1% of the female
population, are thought to account for 20% of the United States prison population and between
33% and 80% of the population of chronic criminal offenders. Furthermore, whereas the ‘typi-
cal’ U.S. burglar is estimated to have committed a median ﬁve crimes per year before being ap-
prehended, chronic offenders–those most likely to be sociopaths–report committing upwards of
50 crimes per year and sometimes as many as two or three hundred. Collectively, these individu-
als are thought to account for over 50% of all crimes in the U.S.” (See Mealy, 1995, p523, and pp
587– 599 for references and caveats; also Lyyken, 1995).542
insure promptness?”) for good service at a restaurant even in a foreign city.
Without a conscious thought you often say, “I owe you one,” in response to an
acquaintance’s favor. So you might choose C with hardly a thought, or, since
he will never know your identity, upon closer reﬂection, you may think that it
just makes no sense not to take the $40. Although you are not a clinical so-
ciopath, here is an opportunity to cut a corner and no one can know. As
Player 1 in Figure 1 are you certain that you would want to play SPE?70
In regard to this reciprocity analysis of the game, we should note that the
game in Figure 1 is a much reduced-form version of the BDM game: think of
Player 1 as sending $10, which becomes $30; Player 2 can either split the $30
equally with Player 1, giving the imputation C, or Player 2 can keep it all,
yielding the D outcome. But there is another difference, one of context. In
the experiment using Figure 1 the subjects play an abstract game, one that is
not embedded in a BDM-type story about sending $10 upstairs, which be-
comes $30, and the receiver can either keep it all or split the gain made pos-
sible by the sender. But given the BDM outcomes reported above we should
not be too surprised that some subject pairs might end at C.
The outcomes are shown in Figure 1 for 24 undergraduate subjects: 50%
move down, and of these 75% “reciprocate.” 
Why So Much Cooperation?
My co-authors and I have interpreted the outcome C as due to reciprocity.
But there are other interpretations; e.g., that the subjects are game theoreti-
cally unsophisticated or have nonselﬁsh preferences. The effect of subjects on
outcomes is an empirical matter, and is most important, but cannot be pur-
sued here in depth. It is essential to programs concerned with extending
game theory to ‘player types.’ Subject background diversity and resulting
choice behavior can help inform the identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of
‘types,’ whether reciprocators, sophisticates or utilitarian. (See McCabe and
Smith, 2001; McCabe, et al., 2001).
Is It The Subjects? Undergraduate’s vs Graduates 
In the above trust game nearly half the Players 1 forego the sure thing, SP,
and threequarters of the responses are cooperative. We have often heard
such results dismissed as a consequence of using naïve subjects. (This dis-
missal has the logical implication that the original theoretical hypothesis is ei-
ther not falsiﬁable or has no predictive content. See footnote 68). McCabe
and Smith (2000) examined this explanation using advanced graduate stu-
dents from the population a sample of whom participated in the $100
70 This thought process may explain why, in data reported by Corelli, McCabe and Smith (2000)
comparing faculty with undergraduate subjects, the faculty take much longer (and earn less
money) than the undergraduates to decide whether to offer cooperation, and whether to defect.
Yet given knowledge of game theory, and knowing that one’s counterpart has the equivalent
knowledge, what is there to think about?543
Exchange/Entitlement version of the ultimatum game reported in Table 2
showing almost identical results for graduate and undergraduate students.
They used the trust game shown in Figure 1. For comparison, McCabe and
Smith (2000) used the undergraduate data shown in Figure 1. In both groups
50% of Players 1 offer cooperation, while 75% of the undergraduate and 64%
of the graduate student Players 2 reciprocate. See Figure 2. However naïve
undergraduates are alleged to be, these tests suggest that graduate students
with training in economic theory are capable of showing very similar behav-
ior in this extensive form game, and in the ultimatum game reported in Table
2.
Is it Utility for Other?
Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) have proposed useful preference models of decision that
aim at accounting for behavior in a variety of experiments, most particularly
ultimatum and dictator games. The idea behind these models is that we can
explain cooperation in bargaining games by saying that people have a taste
for altruism or for ‘fair’ outcomes (or a distaste for ‘unfair’ outcomes), where
fairness is understood as payoff equity, as in Franciosi, et al. (1995). The hy-
pothesis is that subjects seek to maximize these adjusted utilities. It is only the
intrinsic properties of outcomes that are assumed to drive behavior; what al-
ternatives the players faced at a previous decision node are irrelevant. This
means that intentions, as reﬂected in the move choices, are assumed to be su-
Figure 1. Invest $10 Trust Game: Frequency of Play









perﬂuous in the interactions between the parties. The former approach iden-
tiﬁes utility types. The latter identiﬁes types who signal intentions, who are in-
to reading move signals, and risk misidentifying reciprocity vs defection types.
The important testable distinctions are that the former are immune to in-
structional procedures and to path dependency–the opportunity costs of
foregone options; this constitutes the core of the research program of my
coauthors and me. This program leads naturally to an understanding of its
own limitations as well as that of the utilitarian program, i.e., both types may
be needed.
Other-regarding preference models are unable to account for our previous
data demonstrating that procedures and context variables matter. In the ulti-
matum game data reported above where the context is varied from “Divide
$10” to “Context/Exchange”, ostensibly the utilities to the participants are
the same under each ultimatum condition. However, behavior varies dramat-
ically. These models also cannot explain the results reported above in the sin-
gle versus double-blind protocol in dictator games, and the dramatic change
in dictator behavior in the BDM investment trust game. Clearly, the behavior
is much more variable than is expected from outcome-based utility models.
An altruistic utility interpretation of cooperation can be invoked in trust
games like that in Figure 1: Player 2 may move down because her utility for re-
ward is increasing in both own and other payoff. In Figure 3 is a trust game
that enables us to distinguish subjects who cooperate from motivations of al-
truism, and those whose cooperation derives from reciprocity in an ex-
Figure 2. Invest $10 Trust Game Comparing Undergraduates (U) and
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change. The game starts at the top, node x1, with Player 1 who can move
right, which stops the game yielding the upper payoff to player 1, $7, and the
lower payoff to player 2, $14, or move down in which case Player 2 chooses a
move at node x2 If the move is right, each player gets $8. If player 2 moves
down, player 1 can then move right at node x3 yielding $10 for each, or
down, yielding $12 for player 1 and $6 for player 2. The sub-game perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is $8 for each player. This follows because at node x1, play-
er 1 can apply backward induction by observing that if play reaches node x3,
Player 1 will want to move down. But Player 2, also using backward induction
will see that at node x2 he should move right. Since right at node x2 yields a
higher payoff to Player 1, at node x1 player 1 will conclude that he should
move down. Hence, the SPE outcome would prevail by the logic of self-inter-
ested players who always choose dominant strategies, and apply the principle
of backward induction.
If Player 1 has other regarding preferences (altruism) and is willing to incur
some cost to greatly increase the Payoff to player 2, Player 1 may move right at
x1. His payoff of $7 is only one-eighth smaller than his payoff at the SPE, and
yields $14 for player 2. Hence, at a cost of $1 to himself, player 1 can increase
his counterpart Player 2’s payoff by $6. Player 1 need have only a modest pref-
erence for an increase in Player 2’s welfare to induce him to move right be-
cause of the 6 to 1 return for the other player over the cost to Player 1.
At x2, Player 2 may move down signaling to Player 1 that such a move en-
ables both to proﬁt (gains from exchange), provided that at x3 Player 1 co-
operates by reciprocating Player 2’s favor. Alternatively at x3 Player 1 can de-
fect (D) on the offer to cooperate by choosing his dominate strategy, and
move down.
The outcome frequencies for the trust game (N = 26 pairs) are entered di-
rectly on the tree in Figure 3. The ﬁrst result – overwhelmingly decisively – is
that no Player 1 chooses the A (altruistic) outcome; all choose to pass to
Player 2 seeking a higher payoff for themselves, and being content to give
Player 2 a smaller payoff than is achieved at A, depending upon the ﬁnal out-
come of the move sequence. Secondly, 46% offer to cooperate (down), and
50% reciprocate.
Utility vs Exchange. Does Opportunity Cost Matter?
If reciprocity is perceived as an exchange in which each player gains relative
to the default outcome (SPE), then the cooperative outcome must yield an
increase in the size of the prize to be split between the two players. (See
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith, 2002). Also, Player 2 must believe that (i) Player
1 made a deliberate choice to make this outcome possible, and (ii) incurred
an opportunity cost in doing so, i.e., gave up a smaller certain payoff risking
a still smaller payoff if C is not attained. It then becomes credible to Player 2
that Player 1 did a favor for Player 2, and reasonably can expect reciprocal ac-
tion in return. Notice that our argument is in the form of a constructivist the-
ory that need not characterize the subjects’ reasoning, even if it has predic-
tive accuracy; i.e., constructive rationality may predict emergent ecologically546
rational outcomes, just as CE theory predicts market outcomes not part of the
conscious intentions of the agents. McCabe, et al. (2001), however, report
fMRI brain imaging data supporting the hypothesis that subjects who coop-
erate use the ‘mind reading’ circuit modules in their brains (See Baron-
Cohen, 1995). This circuitry is not activated in subjects who choose not to co-
operate (SPE). In responding to post experiment questions asking them to
write their impressions of their decisions, subjects frequently report that the
experiment is all about whether you can trust your counterpart. They do not
refer to returning a favor, to reciprocity, an exchange, fairness, etc., suggest-
ing that if their actions are driven by reciprocity motives, such are not part of
a self-aware reasoning process.
Reciprocity reasoning motivated the alternative game trees shown in
Figure 4 designed to test reciprocity against utility interpretations of choice.
In Figure 4(a) if Player 1 moves down at the top the potential prize increases
from $40 to $50. Player 2 can defect at a cost to Player 1, and can clearly infer
that Player 1 deliberately enabled the outcome to increase from ($20, $20) to
($25, $25). But in Figure 4(b) Player 2 can see that Player 1 was presented
with no voluntary choice to move down. Consequently, Player 1 incurred no
opportunity cost to enable Player 2 to achieve C. Player 1 did nothing inten-
tionally for Player 2, and according to reciprocity reasoning, Player 2 in-
curred no implied debt that needed to be repaid. Player 2 can thus move
down with impunity. Consequently, reciprocity theory predicts a greater fre-
quency of right moves by Players 2 in Figure 4(a) than in Figure 4(b). Since
only outcomes matter, both own and other-regarding utility theories predict
no difference in Player 2’s choices between Figures 4 (a) and 4 (b). In fact, as
shown by the frequency data on the trees, a third of the Players 2 on the right
play C, whereas nearly twice that many choose C in the left game.
Intentions have also been found to matter in a study of ultimatum bar-
gaining: “…we show that identical offers in an ultimatum game trigger vastly
different rejection rates depending on the other offers available to the pro-
poser.” (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 1999, p 2).
Extensive Versus Normal Form Games 
A fundamental principle of game theory is that rational behavior is invariant
to the form– extensive or normal–of the game. Behavior in the extensive and
normal forms has been compared by Schotter, Wiegelt and Wilson (1994),
Rapoport (1997), and McCabe, Smith and LePore (1998). All three reject the
invariance principle, but in the ﬁrst study the rationality principles they pro-
posed to explain the invariance either failed to predict the differences, “or
they were not what we expected.” (Schotter, Wiegelt and Wilson, 1994, pp.
446–447). Rapoport provides two versions of the “Battle-of-the-Sexes” game to
show how order-of-play information in the extensive form allows players to
better coordinate their actions. McCabe, Smith and LePore (1998) argue that
the important principle that allows better coordination “derives from the hu-
man capacity to read another person’s thoughts or intentions by placing
themselves in the position and information state of the other person.” (p.547
4404). This “mind reading” to detect intentions underlies reciprocity. We
summarize here the ﬁndings of McCabe, Smith and LePore (1998) for the
trimmed version of the game they study, which is the game we have depicted
in Figure 3.
In the extensive form of the game in Figure 3, Player 2 sees the move of
Player 1 before Player 2 chooses to move. In this form of the game intentions
can be clearly communicated along the lines storied above. In the normal (or
strategic) form of the same game each player chooses a move at each node
without knowing whether that node will actually be reached in the move se-
quence. Decisions are thus contingent on the node being reached and may
be irrelevant in determining the payoffs. In the normal form, therefore we
can present the game as an n x m matrix of the n = 3 strategies of Player
1–right at node x1, right or down at node x3, and the m = 2 strategies of
Player 2, right or down at node x2. Players 1 and 2 each simultaneously
choose among these alternatives not knowing the choice of the other.
McCabe, Smith and LePore (1998) predict that Players 2 will move down at
x2, with higher frequency in the extensive than the normal from. They also
predict higher rates of cooperation by Players 1 (and lower defection rates) in
Figure 3. Trust Game with Altruism: Frequency of Play548
the extensive than normal forms. Neither own- or otherregarding utility the-
ory can support these predictions. The data are shown in Table 4: 46% of the
Players 1 offer to cooperate in the extensive form, only 29% in the normal
form. Similarly, they observe a 50% cooperative rate by Players 2 in the ex-
tensive form, but only 14% in the normal form.
These results and that of others cited above imply that the extensive and
normal forms are not played as if they were the same games. Players’ moves
signal intentions that are not the same when actually experienced in exten-
sive form as when imagined in a mental experiment corresponding to the
normal form. I would argue that experience and its memory in life is an ex-
tensive process that encodes context along with outcome. The brain is not
naturally adapted to solve all sequential move problems by reducing them to
a single strategy vector as in a highly structured game. Apparently, we have a
built-in tendency to wait, observe, then decide–a process that conserves cog-
nitive resources by applying them only to contingencies that are realized, and
avoids the need for revision, given the inevitable surprises in the less struc-
tured games of life.71 Constructivist modeling glosses over distinctions of
which we are unaware that govern the ecology of choice. Experimental de-
signs conditioned only by constructivist thinking, ill prepare us to collect the
data that can inform needed revisions in our thinking. It is both cost effective
Table 4. Branch Conditional Outcomes for One-shot Game: Extensive Versus




71 Any such natural process must be deliberately overcome, constructively, in situations where na-
ture serves us poorly.549
and faithful to game theoretic assumptions in experiments to collect move
data from each subject under all contingencies, but it distorts interpretability
if game forms are not equivalent. The assumptions of game theory, such as
those leading to the logical equivalence of the two game forms, should not be
imposed on experimental designs, thereby constraining our understanding
of behavior beyond those assumptions.
Figure 4a. Voluntary Trust Game
Figure 4b. Involuntary Trust GameNeuroeconomics 
Neuroeconomics is concerned with studying the connections between how
the mind/brain works–the internal order of the mind–and behavior in (1) in-
dividual decision making, (2) social exchange and (3) institutions such as
markets. The working hypothesis is that the brain has evolved different, but
interdependent, adaptive mechanisms for each of these tasks involving expe-
rience, memory and perception. The tools include brain imaging technology
and the existence of patients with localized brain lesions associated with spe-
ciﬁc loss of certain mental functions.
Decision making has drawn the attention of neuroscientists who study the
deviant behavior of neurological patients with speciﬁc brain lesions, such as
front lobe (ventromedial prefrontal) damage. Such patients have long been
known to be challenged by tasks involving planning and coordination over
time, although they score normally on batteries of psychological tests.
(Damasio, 1994). A landmark experimental study of such patients (compared
with controls) in individual decision making under uncertainty is that of
Bechara et al. (1997). Starting with (ﬁctional) endowments of $2000, each
subject on each trial, draws a card from one of four freely chosen decks, (A,
B, C, D). In decks (A, B) each card has a payoff value of $50, whereas in decks
(C, D), each is worth $100. Also, the $100 decks contain occasional large ne-
gative payoff cards, while the $50 decks have much smaller negative payoff
cards. All this must be learned from single card draws in a sequence of trials,
with a running tally of cumulative payoff value. A subject performs much bet-
ter by learning to avoid the $100 decks in favor of the $50 decks. By period
60, normal control subjects have learned to draw only from the $50, (C, D)
decks, while the brain damaged subjects continue to sample disadvanta-
geously the $100, (A, B) decks. Furthermore, the control subjects shift to the
(C, D) decks before they are able to articulate why, in periodic questioning.
Also, they pre-register emotional reactions to the (A, B) decks as measured by
real time skin conductivity test (SCT) readings. But the brain damaged pa-
tients tend to verbally rationalize continued sampling of the (A, B) decks, and
some types (with damaged amygdala) register no SCT response. Results con-
sistent with those of Bechara et al. (1997) have been reported by Goel et al.
(1997) who study patient performance in a complex ﬁnancial planning task.
Over 50 years ago experiments with animal behavior demonstrated that
motivation was based on relative or foregone reward – opportunity cost – and
not on an absolute scale of values generated by the brain. Thus Zeaman
(1949) reported experiments in which rats were trained to run for a large re-
ward motivated goal. When shifted to a small reward, the rats responded by
running more slowly than they would to the small reward only. A control
group began with a small reward and shifted to a large one, and these rats im-
mediately ran faster than if the large reward alone was applied. Monkeys si-
milarly respond to comparisons of differential rewards. It is now established
that orbitofrontal cortex (just above the eyes) neuron activity in monkeys en-
able them to discriminate between rewards that are directly related to the ani-
mals’ relative, as distinct from absolute, preference among rewards such as ce-
550real, apple and raisins (in order of increasing preference in monkeys).
(Tremblay and Schultz, 1999).
Thus suppose A is preferred to B is preferred to C based on choice re-
sponse. Then neuronal activity is greater for A than for B when the subject is
viewing A and B, and similarly for B and C when comparing B and C. But the
activity associated with B is much greater when compared with C than when it
is compared with A. This is contrary to what one would expect to observe if A,
B and C are coded on a ﬁxed properties scale rather than a relative scale
(Tremblay and Schultz, 1999, p. 706).
These studies have a parallel signiﬁcance for humans. Prospect theory pro-
poses that the evaluation of a gamble depends not on the total asset position
but focuses myopically on the opportunity cost, gain or loss, relative to one’s
current asset position. There is also asymmetry – the effect of a loss looms
larger than the effect of gain of the same magnitude. (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Mellers et al. (1997) have shown that the emotional response
to the outcome of a gamble depends on the perceived value and likelihood of
the outcome and on the foregone outcome. It feels better (less bad) to re-
ceive $0 from a gamble when you forgo +$10 than when you forgo +$90.
(They use the term “counterfactual” rather than “opportunity cost” to refer
to the alternative that might have prevailed). Thus, our ability to form op-
portunity cost comparisons receive important neurophysiological support
from our emotional circuitry. Breiter et al. (2001) use these same principles in
the design of a functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) study of human hemo-
dynamic responses to both the expectation and experience of monetary gains
and losses under uncertainty. They observed signiﬁcant activation responses
in the amygdala and orbital gyrus, with both activations increasing with the
expected value of the gamble. There was also some evidence that the right
hemisphere is predominantly active for gains, and the left for losses–a partic-
ularly interesting possibility inviting deeper examination, perhaps by imaging
splitbrain subjects in the same task.
The effect of paying subjects is informed by Thut et al. (1997) who com-
pare brain activation under monetary rewards with the feedback of an ‘OK’
reinforcement in a dichotomous choice task. The monetary rewards yielded a
signiﬁcantly higher activation of the orbitofrontal cortex and other related
brain areas. (Also see Schultz, 2000, 2002). 
The neural correlates of individual decision-making were extended, by
McCabe et al. (2001), to an fMRI study of behavior in two person strategic in-
teractions in extensive form trust games like those in Figures 1 to 4. The prior
hypothesis, derived from reciprocity theory, the theory-of-mind literature,
and supported by imaging results from individual studies of cued thought
processes (Fletcher et al. 1995), was that cooperators would show greater ac-
tivation in the prefrontal cortex (speciﬁcally BA-8) and supporting circuitry,
than non cooperators. The control, for comparison with the mental process-
es used when a subject is playing a human, is for the subject to play a com-
puter knowing the programmed response probabilities and therefore having
no need to interpret moves as intentions. The predicted activations were sig-
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niﬁcantly greater, relative to controls, for cooperators than non cooperators,
and are consistent with the reciprocity interpretation of behavior discussed
above.
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Cartesian constructivism applies reason to the design of rules for individual
action, to the design of institutions that yield socially optimal outcomes, and
constitutes the standard socioeconomic science model. But most of our op-
erating knowledge, and ability to decide and perform is non-deliberative.
Our brains conserve attentional, conceptual and symbolic thought resources
because they are scarce, and proceeds to delegate most decision-making to
autonomic processes (including the emotions) that do not require conscious
attention. Emergent arrangements, even if initially constructivist, must have
survival properties that incorporate opportunity costs and environmental
challenges invisible to constructivist modeling. This leads to an alternative,
ecological concept, of rationality: an emergent order based on trial-and-error
cultural and biological evolutionary processes. It yields home- and socially-
grown rules of action, traditions and moral principles that underlie property
rights in impersonal exchange, and social cohesion in personal exchange. To
study ecological rationality we use rational reconstruction–for example, reci-
procity or other regarding preferences–to examine individual behavior, emer-
gent order in human culture and institutions, and their persistence, diversity
and development over time. Experiments enable us to test propositions de-
rived from these rational reconstructions.
The study of both kinds of rationality has been prominent in the work of
experimental economists. This is made plain in the many direct tests of the
observable implications of propositions derived from economic and game
theory. It is also evident in the great variety of experiments that have reached
far beyond the theory to ask why the tests have succeeded, failed, or per-
formed better (under weaker conditions) than was expected. What have we
learned, not as ﬁnal truth, but as compelling working hypotheses for contin-
uing examination?
1. Markets constitute an engine of productivity by supporting resource spe-
cialization through trade and creating a diverse wealth of goods and services.
2. Markets are rule-governed institutions providing algorithms that select,
process and order the exploratory messages of agents who are better in-
formed as to their personal circumstances than that of others. As precaution-
ary probes by agents yield to contracts, each becomes more certain of what
must be given in order to receive. Out of this interaction between minds
through the intermediary of rules the process aggregates the dispersed asym-
metric information, converging more-or-less rapidly to competitive equilibria
if they exist. Each experimental market carries its own unique mark with a dif-
ferent dynamic path.
3. All this information is captured in the static or time variable supply and
demand environment and must be aggregated to yield efﬁcient clearing553
prices. We can never fully understand how this process works in the world be-
cause the required information is not given, or available, to any one mind.
Thus, for many the arguments of the Scottish philosophers and of Hayek are
obscure and mystical. But we can design experiments in which the informa-
tion is not given to any participant, then compare market outcomes with efﬁ-
cient competitive outcomes and gauge a market institution’s performance.
4. The resulting order is invisible to the participants, unlike the visible
gains they reap. Agents discover what they need to know to achieve outcomes
optimal against the constraining limits imposed by others.
5. Rules emerge as a spontaneous order–they are found–not deliberately
designed by one calculating mind. Initially constructivist institutions undergo
evolutionary change adapting beyond the circumstances that gave them
birth. What emerges is a form of “social mind” that solves complex organiza-
tion problems without conscious cognition. This “social mind” is born of the
interaction among all individuals through the rules of institutions that have
to date survived cultural selection processes.
6. This process accommodates trade offs between the cost of transacting, at-
tending and monitoring, and the efﬁciency of the allocations so that the insti-
tution itself generates an order of economy that ﬁts the problem it evolved to
solve. Hence, the hundreds of variations on the ﬁne structure of institutions,
each designed without a designer to accommodate disparate conditions, but
all of them subservient to the reality of dispersed agent information.
7. We understand little about how rule systems for social interaction and
markets emerge, but it is possible in the laboratory to do variations on the
rules, and thus to study that which is not.
8. Markets require enforcement–voluntary or involuntary–of the rules of
exchange. These are: the right possession, it’s transference by consent, and
the performance of promises (Hume). Voluntary enforcement occurs when
people in the market reward good services with gratuities or ‘tips,’ an exam-
ple, perhaps, of an emergent cultural norm in which people recognize that
tips are part of an informal exchange. If self or community enforcement con-
ditions are not present, the result is unintended consequences for the bad, as
markets are compromised or may fail. The game of ‘trade’ must not yield to
the game of ‘steal.’ 
9. Reciprocity, trust and trustworthiness are important in personal ex-
change where formal markets are not worth their cost, yet there are gains
from exchange to be captured. They are also important in contracting as not
every margin of gain at the expense of other can be anticipated and formal-
ized in written contracts.
10. People are not required to be selﬁsh; rather the point of the Scottish
philosophers was that people did not have to be good to produce good.
Markets economize on information, understanding, rationality, numbers of
agents, and virtue.
11. Markets in no way need destroy the foundation upon which they prob-
ably emerged–social exchange between family, friends and associates. This is
supported in the studies reported by Heinrich (2000). Thus, individuals canbe habitual social exchangers and vigorous traders as well, but as in Hayek’s
‘two worlds’ text, the ecologically rational co-existence of personal and im-
personal exchange is not a self-aware Cartesian construct. Consequently,
there is the ever-present danger that the rules of ‘personal exchange’ will be
applied inappropriately to govern or modify the extended order of markets.
Equally dangerous, the rules of impersonal market exchange may be applied
inappropriately to our cohesive social networks.
12. New brain imaging technologies have motivated neuroeconomic stud-
ies of the internal order of the mind and its links with the spectrum of human
decision from choice among ﬁxed gambles to choice mediated by market and
other institutional rules. We are only at the beginning of this enterprise, but
its promise suggests a fundamental change in how we think, observe and
model decision in all its contexts.
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